Introduction
The emergence of cryptocurrency as a major innovation in modern financial regulation and blockchain technology has posed significant challenges for legal systems seeking to control digital assets and prevent financial crimes such as money laundering. The current study aimed to conduct a comparative analysis of the criminal policy approaches adopted by the United States and Iran in regulating cryptocurrencies, examining how each country addresses the risks of money laundering, terrorist financing, and other illicit financial activities within the blockchain ecosystem. Focusing on anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF), the study investigated how cryptocurrencies—due to features such as decentralization, rapid cross-border transferability, and the difficulty of reliably identifying users—offer substantial potential for financial innovation while also creating opportunities for criminal misuse. Against this backdrop, a comparative analysis was conducted to see how the two legal systems have conceptualized, categorized, and regulated cryptocurrencies, and to identify the key differences between them in institution-building, legislation, supervisory instruments, consumer protection, and international engagement. In addition, the applied objective of the research was to present a clear assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Iran’s criminal policy in comparison with the U.S. model, with a view to developing policy recommendations for reforming Iran’s legal framework and strengthening its regulatory capacity. Ultimately, the study sought to answer what form of criminal and regulatory policymaking could enable Iran—while respecting religious–jurisprudential and security considerations—to safely and effectively harness the potential of cryptocurrencies.
Materials and Methods
As a comparative–analytical inquiry, the current study relied on library and documentary research methods to collect the data from various sources, including domestic laws and regulations of Iran and the United States, official reports issued by supervisory authorities, international instruments, and existing scholarly literature. The analysis covered a ten-year period (2013 to 2024), a period in which cryptocurrencies evolved from a marginal technology into a central concern of financial regulation and criminal policymaking. Concerning the American context, the analysis focused on the role of key institutions, such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The analysis of the Iranian context took into account the Anti-Money Laundering Law, the Central Bank’s directives and policy positions, policies related to cryptocurrency mining, and relevant executive and judicial practices. In addition, transnational instruments and standards (e.g., the FATF Recommendations) and emerging regulatory approaches (e.g., the European Union’s experience) were also considered as supplementary comparative benchmarks. Using qualitative content analysis, the study categorized and compared relevant legal and policy materials across four core dimensions: (1) institutional regulatory structures; (2) AML legal frameworks; (3) technical and legal challenges in detecting, investigating, and prosecuting cryptocurrency-related crimes; and (4) the degree of alignment with international rules and cooperation mechanisms.
Results and Discussion
Despite the absence of a comprehensive, unified federal statute on cryptocurrencies, the United States has developed a relatively effective regulatory model in practice through a specialized, multi-agency structure. Under this model, each agency addresses a distinct aspect of the issue: FinCEN focuses on AML requirements and suspicious transaction reporting; the SEC addresses the securities-law dimensions of certain tokens; the CFTC supervises assets that may be treated as commodities and related derivatives markets; and the IRS deals with on tax implications. This institutional architecture enables the use of tools such as customer due diligence and identity verification, financial reporting obligations, blockchain analytics, and cooperation with exchanges to detect illicit patterns. However, as the findings showed, the U.S. system faces serious challenges, including overlapping agency jurisdictions, inconsistencies between state and federal regulations, ambiguity in the legal classification of certain digital assets (e.g., the distinction between securities and commodities), and the tendency of legislation to lag behind technological developments such as DeFi, smart contracts, and stablecoins.
In contrast, Iran has adopted a cautious, restrictive, and partly reactive approach. Under Iran’s official policy, the use of cryptocurrencies as a domestic means of payment is prohibited; however, cryptocurrency mining is recognized under licensing and specific conditions, and in certain cases, the use of cryptocurrency for financing imports is also permitted. This dual-track approach, combined with the absence of a comprehensive law, has led to an ambiguous and at times contradictory legal status. Moreover, Iran’s challenges are not merely legislative; they also extend to technical, institutional, and even jurisprudential (fiqh-based) dimensions. The challenges include the absence of a clear legal classification of cryptocurrencies, the lack of a specialized central regulatory body, severe limitations in access to blockchain analytics tools (especially due to sanctions), weak consumer protection, and jurisprudential disagreements regarding the legitimacy of cryptocurrency ownership and transactions. Although Iran’s Anti-Money Laundering Law and its amendments represent important steps toward alignment with global standards, the framework is designed primarily for the traditional financial system and does not adequately address the specific features of blockchain-based assets. As a result, Iran’s cryptocurrency sector has in practice shifted toward semi-formal or informal activity, thereby increasing the risks of fraud, capital flight, and difficulties in criminal prosecution.
The analysis went beyond describing the legal status of cryptocurrencies. Instead, it adopted an integrated analytical approach that brought criminal policy, financial regulation, technological infrastructure, jurisprudential considerations, and geopolitical or sanctions-related conditions into a single framework. This synthesis adds substantial value—particularly in the Iranian context—by showing that ineffective cryptocurrency policymaking cannot not attributed solely to the absence of legislation, but rather to the combined effects of institutional fragmentation, inadequate technical tools, ambiguity in legal and jurisprudential concepts, and restricted international engagement. A further contribution concerns concrete policy implications for Iran, derived from the comparison with the U.S. experience, while avoiding any simplistic transplantation of the American model. The analysis suggested that an appropriate framework for Iran be indigenous and multi-layered, reflecting the country’s actual capacities and incorporating legislation, institution-building, regulatory technology, and a jurisprudential annex.
Conclusion
Based on the comparative analysis, it can be concluded that success in cryptocurrency regulation and AML enforcement depends less on the severity of restrictions than on the quality of governance—specifically, the presence of specialized institutions, clear rules, reliable technical tools, and effective mechanisms for both domestic and international coordination. The study highlighted the importance of international cooperation and comparative criminal policy strategies between countries like the United States and Iran in responding to the global rise of cryptocurrency. Despite institutional shortcomings and inter-agency disagreements, the United States has succeeded in establishing a relatively coherent framework for monitoring and controlling cryptocurrency-related crimes. Iran, by contrast, remains in a more vulnerable position due to the absence of a comprehensive legal framework, the lack of a clearly designated central authority, ambiguity surrounding the legal and jurisprudential status of cryptocurrencies, weak supervisory infrastructure, and constraints arising from international sanctions.
Accordingly, several fundamental measures are necessary to improve Iran’s criminal policy and cryptocurrency regulation. These measure include adopting a comprehensive cryptocurrency law with precise definitions of concepts and responsibilities; establishing or designating a specialized central authority for digital-asset regulation; strengthening the Financial Intelligence Unit and mandating effective cooperation by domestic exchanges with AML mechanisms; investing in the development of indigenous blockchain analytics tools and in specialized training for judges, law enforcement officers, and experts; and designing regional or international cooperation models suited to existing political constraints. In addition, preventing conceptual and policy confusion requires clarifying the legal and functional relationship between the Digital Rial (Ramzrial) and other forms of digital assets, and clearly distinguishing it from decentralized cryptocurrencies. Overall, cryptocurrencies are not a temporary phenomenon but part of the structural reality of the future digital economy. Therefore, any delay in adopting coherent, technology-oriented policymaking in Iran may have serious consequences for economic security, financial transparency, and public trust.