Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

• Abbas Faghih ¹
• Abbas Barzegarzadeh ²
• Maryam Safae ³

¹ Ph.D., Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Islamic Azad University, Bushehr Branch, Bushehr, Iran.

² Assistant Professor of International Law, Faculty of Humanities, Islamic Azad University, Bushehr Branch, Bushehr, Iran

³ Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Islamic Azad University, Bushehr Branch, Bushehr, Iran.

Abstract

Introduction
The emergence of cryptocurrency as a major innovation in modern financial regulation and blockchain technology has introduced significant challenges for legal systems seeking to control digital assets and prevent financial crimes such as money laundering. This study conducts a comparative analysis of the criminal policy approaches of the United States and Iran in regulating cryptocurrencies, examining how each country addresses risks associated with money laundering, terrorist financing, and illicit financial activities within the blockchain ecosystem. In the United States, a multilayered system of financial regulation and oversight—implemented by agencies such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)—has created a relatively coherent framework for monitoring cryptocurrency transactions. These institutions apply advanced regulatory instruments to track crypto related crimes and manage threats associated with money laundering and unlawful use of blockchain based assets. In contrast, Iran follows a more restrictive and cautious criminal policy toward cryptocurrency, focusing primarily on controlling transactions and preventing currency misuse within its financial system. Despite this approach, Iran continues to face substantial regulatory gaps due to limitations in financial regulation, insufficient blockchain related technology, and the absence of an integrated legal structure. The findings show that Iran must reform its criminal policy and strengthen its financial regulation mechanisms by investing in intelligent supervisory systems linked to blockchain technology. Such improvements are crucial to ensuring the safe use of cryptocurrency and effectively addressing challenges such as money laundering. The study ultimately highlights the importance of international cooperation and comparative criminal policy strategies between countries like the United States and Iran in responding to the global rise of cryptocurrency.
Objective
This study was conducted with the aim of comparatively analyzing the criminal and regulatory policies of the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran in addressing cryptocurrencies, particularly in the areas of anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF). The central research problem is that cryptocurrencies, due to features such as decentralization, rapid cross-border transferability, and the difficulty of identifying users’ real identities, simultaneously possess significant capacity for financial innovation and criminal misuse. Within this framework, the study seeks to demonstrate how the two legal systems under review have understood, classified, and regulated this phenomenon, and what differences exist between them in terms of institution-building, legislation, supervisory tools, consumer protection, and international engagement. In addition, the applied objective of the research is to provide a clear picture of the strengths and weaknesses of Iran’s criminal policy in comparison with the U.S. model, so that policy recommendations may be formulated for reforming Iran’s legal structure and enhancing its regulatory capacity. Ultimately, the study aims to answer the question of what type of criminal and regulatory policymaking could enable Iran—while observing religious-jurisprudential and security considerations—to safely utilize the capacities of cryptocurrencies.
Methodology
This research is a comparative-analytical study and, in terms of purpose, an applied one. The research data were collected through library-based and documentary methods and include domestic laws and regulations of Iran and the United States, official reports issued by supervisory authorities, international instruments, and prior scholarly studies. In the U.S. section, the analysis focuses on the role of institutions such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In the Iran section, the Anti-Money Laundering Law, directives and policy positions of the Central Bank, policies related to cryptocurrency mining, and relevant executive and judicial practices were examined. In addition, transnational instruments and standards—such as the FATF Recommendations and emerging regulatory models (including the European Union experience)—were considered as supplementary comparative benchmarks. Data were analyzed using the method of qualitative content analysis, and the legal and policy texts were classified and compared across four principal dimensions: (1) institutional regulatory structures, (2) legal AML frameworks, (3) technical and legal challenges in identifying and prosecuting cryptocurrency-related crimes, and (4) the degree of alignment with international rules and cooperation mechanisms. The temporal scope of the study primarily covers the past decade (2013–2024), a period during which cryptocurrencies evolved from a marginal technology into a central subject of financial and criminal policymaking.
Findings
The findings indicate that, despite the absence of a comprehensive and unified federal statute on cryptocurrencies, the United States has been able to establish a relatively effective operational regulatory model through a specialized multi-agency structure. Under this model, each agency addresses a distinct aspect of the issue: FinCEN focuses on AML requirements and suspicious transaction reporting; the SEC addresses the securities-law dimensions of certain tokens; the CFTC supervises assets that may be treated as commodities and their derivatives markets; and the IRS concentrates on tax implications. This institutional architecture has enabled the United States to employ tools such as customer due diligence/identity verification, financial reporting obligations, blockchain analytics, and cooperation with exchanges to detect criminal patterns. At the same time, the findings show that the U.S. system also faces serious challenges, including jurisdictional overlap among agencies, inconsistencies between state and federal regulations, ambiguity in the legal characterization of certain digital assets (e.g., the distinction between “securities” and “commodities”), and the relative lag of legislation behind technological developments (such as DeFi, smart contracts, and stablecoins).
In contrast, Iran has adopted a cautious, restrictive, and partly reactive approach. Under Iran’s official policy, the use of cryptocurrencies as a domestic means of payment is prohibited; however, cryptocurrency mining is recognized under licensing and specific conditions, and in certain cases the use of cryptocurrency for financing imports has also been permitted. This dual-track approach, combined with the absence of a comprehensive law, has produced an ambiguous and at times contradictory legal status. The findings show that Iran’s challenges are not merely legislative; they also involve technical, institutional, and even jurisprudential (fiqh-based) dimensions: the absence of a clear legal classification of cryptocurrencies, the lack of a specialized central regulatory body, severe limitations in access to blockchain analytics tools (especially due to sanctions), weak legal protection for consumers, and jurisprudential disagreements regarding the legitimacy of cryptocurrency ownership and transactions. Moreover, although Iran’s Anti-Money Laundering Law and its amendments have constituted important steps toward alignment with global standards, this framework was designed primarily for the traditional financial system and does not adequately address the specific features of blockchain-based assets. As a result, Iran’s cryptocurrency space has, in practice, shifted toward semi-formal or informal activity, increasing the risks of fraud, capital flight, and difficulties in criminal prosecution.
Originality (Value)
The principal innovation of this research is that it does not merely describe the legal status of cryptocurrencies; rather, it adopts an integrated analytical approach that places “criminal policy,” “financial regulation,” “technological infrastructure,” “jurisprudential considerations,” and “geopolitical/sanctions-related conditions” within a single framework. This combination generates significant added value, particularly in the case of Iran, because it demonstrates that the inefficiency of cryptocurrency policymaking is not caused solely by the absence of legislation, but is instead the concurrent product of institutional fragmentation, weak technical tools, ambiguity in legal and jurisprudential concepts, and restricted international engagement. Another contribution of the study lies in extracting concrete policy implications for Iran from a comparison with the U.S. experience—without advocating a simplistic transplantation of the American model. The study shows that the appropriate model for Iran must be indigenous, multi-layered, and grounded in the country’s actual capacities; a model in which legislation, institution-building, regulatory technology, and a jurisprudential annex are all addressed simultaneously. In this respect, the present research can provide a suitable conceptual and applied foundation for legal scholars and criminologists, financial policymakers, and judicial and supervisory authorities alike.
Conclusion
Based on the results of the comparative analysis, it may be concluded that success in cryptocurrency regulation and anti-money laundering enforcement depends less on the “intensity of restriction” and more on the “quality of governance”; namely, the existence of specialized institutions, clear rules, reliable technical tools, and mechanisms for national and international coordination. Despite institutional shortcomings and inter-agency disagreements, the United States, by virtue of its strong institutional and technological capacity, has succeeded in establishing a relatively coherent framework for monitoring and controlling cryptocurrency-related crimes. Iran, however, due to the absence of a comprehensive law, the lack of a clearly designated central authority, ambiguity in the legal and jurisprudential status of cryptocurrencies, weak supervisory infrastructure, and sanctions-related constraints, remains in a more vulnerable position. Accordingly, several fundamental measures are necessary to improve Iran’s criminal policy and cryptocurrency regulation: adopting a comprehensive cryptocurrency law with precise definitions of concepts and responsibilities; establishing or designating a specialized central authority for digital-asset regulation; strengthening the Financial Intelligence Unit and mandating effective cooperation by domestic exchanges with AML mechanisms; investing in the development of indigenous blockchain analytics tools and in specialized training for judges, law enforcement officers, and experts; and designing regional or international cooperation models suited to existing political constraints. In addition, clarifying the legal and functional relationship between the “Digital Rial (Ramzrial)” and other forms of digital assets, and clearly distinguishing it from decentralized cryptocurrencies, is crucial to prevent conceptual and policy confusion. Overall, cryptocurrencies are not a temporary phenomenon but part of the structural reality of the future digital economy; therefore, delay in coherent, technology-oriented policymaking in Iran may have serious consequences for economic security, financial transparency, and public trust.

Keywords

• Cryptocurrency
• Money Laundering
• Criminal Policy
• United States
• Iran
• Financial Regulation
• Blockchain Technology

Main Subjects

• International Criminal