Criminal law and criminology
Roya Safari; Behrooz Javanmard; Mohammad Rouhollahi
Abstract
IntroductionIran’s banking system plays a decisive and structurally dominant role in the country’s economic framework. In the absence of a fully developed and efficient capital market capable of independently financing large-scale productive and commercial activities, banks shoulder the principal ...
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IntroductionIran’s banking system plays a decisive and structurally dominant role in the country’s economic framework. In the absence of a fully developed and efficient capital market capable of independently financing large-scale productive and commercial activities, banks shoulder the principal responsibility for funding both public and private sectors. Through the allocation of credit facilities, they effectively determine the circulation of liquidity, shape patterns of investment, and influence the distribution of national resources. Their decisions directly affect economic growth, financial stability, and public confidence in the monetary system. This central position makes their conduct in granting loans not merely a contractual or managerial matter, but an issue with broader social, economic, and legal implications. Against this background, the present study examines whether banks can incur criminal liability when they grant credit facilities without obtaining adequate guarantees, and whether such liability is legally and normatively defensible under Iranian law.MethodologyThe research adopts a descriptive–analytical approach grounded in documentary sources, including statutory provisions, doctrinal analyses, and scholarly writings on banks criminal liability. It first outlines the transformation of criminal law from a strictly individualistic system to a modern framework that recognizes the criminal liability of legal persons. Particular attention is given to Article 143 of the Islamic Penal Code of 2013, which establishes that legal entities may be held criminally liable where their legal representatives commit crimes in the name of, or in furtherance of the interests of, the entity. This provision reflects a significant normative shift and provides the legal foundation for assessing the responsibility of banks as corporate actors within the criminal justice system.The study then considers the principal theories that justify attributing criminal responsibility to legal persons. The identification theory treats the actions and intent of senior managers and high-ranking officials as the actions and intent of the corporation itself. Under this approach, when individuals who represent the “directing mind” of the institution engage in unlawful conduct, their mental state and behavior are attributed directly to the legal entity. The theory of superior responsibility, by contrast, emphasizes failures of oversight and control, suggesting that inadequate supervision may ground liability. Organizational liability moves further by focusing on structural and systemic deficiencies within institutions, recognizing that wrongdoing in complex organizations often arises not from isolated acts but from embedded practices, flawed incentive systems, or compliance failures. These theoretical models are applied to the specific context of banking operations, particularly the process of approving and granting credit facilities.Granting loans without adequate guarantees is not a minor procedural lapse or a simple administrative irregularity. In the banking sector, guarantees—whether personal, such as suretyship, or real, such as mortgages and pledged assets—constitute a fundamental safeguard against credit risk. Credit risk is widely recognized as one of the most significant risks faced by financial institutions. Sound banking practice requires thorough assessment of borrowers’ financial capacity, evaluation of collateral sufficiency, and adherence to regulatory standards governing credit allocation. When banks neglect these standards, they expose not only themselves but also depositors, shareholders, and the broader economy to substantial harm.FindingsThe findings of this study indicate that, under certain conditions, granting facilities without sufficient guarantees may give rise to criminal liability for banks as legal persons. Not every instance of poor judgment or economic loss qualifies as criminal conduct. The threshold of criminal responsibility is crossed where the granting of unsecured or inadequately secured facilities is accompanied by legally relevant fault—such as intentional misconduct, abuse of authority, collusion, or gross negligence that seriously endangers protected economic interests. Where authorized representatives—such as board members or senior managers—approve such facilities in the name of the bank or for its perceived benefit, and where this conduct constitutes a criminal offense under applicable law, the conditions set forth in Article 143 may be satisfied. In such cases, liability is not confined to individual decision-makers; the bank itself may be held accountable as an independent subject of criminal law.Moreover, even in situations where individual intent is difficult to establish with precision, organizational failures may provide a separate basis for responsibility. Systemic weaknesses in internal controls, ineffective compliance mechanisms, deficient credit assessment procedures, or deliberate tolerance of risky and unlawful lending practices may reflect a broader institutional fault. Modern approaches to corporate criminal liability recognize that misconduct within complex organizations frequently stems from structural incentives, managerial culture, or persistent supervisory deficiencies. In this sense, the absence of adequate guarantees may signal deeper shortcomings in governance and risk management rather than an isolated managerial error. Beyond its legal feasibility, the recognition of criminal liability in such cases is supported by strong policy considerations. Deterrence plays a crucial role in financial regulation. Banks operate on the foundation of public trust; their stability and credibility are essential to economic order and social confidence. The prospect of criminal sanctions—whether monetary penalties, activity restrictions, or other measures—creates a powerful incentive for institutions to strengthen compliance systems, improve risk assessment procedures, and adhere strictly to professional and legal standards. Furthermore, effective enforcement requires holding entities accountable where individual liability alone would be insufficient. Given the complexity and hierarchical nature of banking structures, identifying a single responsible individual may be difficult, and limiting prosecution to natural persons could weaken the preventive and compensatory functions of criminal law.Irresponsible lending practices may also facilitate broader economic crimes, including embezzlement, corruption, favoritism, or misappropriation of public resources. In an economy where banks dominate financial intermediation, the consequences of such conduct extend far beyond private contractual disputes and may undermine economic justice. Recognizing corporate criminal liability, therefore, aligns with preventive criminal policy and anti-corruption objectives, reinforcing accountability within key economic institutions and safeguarding the integrity of financial governance.ConclusionIn conclusion, the study demonstrates that the criminal liability of banks for granting credit facilities without adequate guarantees is both legally grounded and practically justified within the Iranian legal framework. The Islamic Penal Code provides a clear doctrinal basis for attributing responsibility to legal persons when crimes are committed in their name or interest.
Criminal law and criminology
Rahman Sabouhi; Hamidreza Yazdani
Abstract
Problem Statement and Literature Review:
Goods smuggling represents one of the most persistent and structurally complex forms of economic crime, generating wide-ranging adverse effects on national economic security, fiscal revenues, market stability, and public trust in regulatory institutions. In recent ...
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Problem Statement and Literature Review:
Goods smuggling represents one of the most persistent and structurally complex forms of economic crime, generating wide-ranging adverse effects on national economic security, fiscal revenues, market stability, and public trust in regulatory institutions. In recent decades, the globalization of trade, expansion of cross-border supply chains, and rapid digitalization of logistics have fundamentally transformed the nature of smuggling activities. Organized smuggling networks increasingly rely on sophisticated methods, regulatory arbitrage, and exploitation of institutional weaknesses, rendering traditional customs control mechanisms largely ineffective.
Historically, customs administrations relied on extensive physical inspections, random checks, and reactive enforcement strategies. However, international experiences and criminological literature emphasize that such approaches are inefficient, costly, and incompatible with the growing volume of international trade. Consequently, contemporary customs systems have gradually shifted toward customs risk management, a data-driven and intelligence-led approach that enables the selective targeting of high-risk consignments while facilitating low-risk trade.
At the international level, the World Customs Organization (WCO) has institutionalized risk-based customs control through key instruments such as the Revised Kyoto Convention, the SAFE Framework of Standards, and guidelines on Authorized Economic Operators (AEO). These instruments emphasize systematic risk identification, risk analysis, inter-agency data exchange, and continuous monitoring. Numerous empirical studies confirm that effective customs risk management enhances enforcement efficiency, reduces transaction costs, and strengthens voluntary compliance.
Despite formal commitments to international customs standards, the Iranian customs system continues to experience a significant gap between normative adoption and practical implementation of risk management principles. Iran’s geopolitical position, extensive land and maritime borders, and role as a regional transit corridor have intensified its exposure to smuggling risks. Official statistics indicate tens of thousands of detected smuggling cases annually; nevertheless, seizure-based indicators suggest that only a limited proportion of actual smuggling flows are intercepted. This discrepancy underscores structural deficiencies in risk identification, data integration, and institutional coordination.
Existing domestic literature in Iran has addressed smuggling primarily from legal, criminological, or enforcement-oriented perspectives. However, systematic analysis of customs risk management as a policy tool, particularly through a comparative assessment with international customs standards, remains limited. This research seeks to address this gap by examining the underlying causes of the implementation deficit and proposing a localized and operational risk management model compatible with Iran’s legal and institutional framework.
Research Objectives
The primary objective of this study is to analyze the causes of the discrepancy between international customs risk management standards and their practical implementation within Iran’s customs system, and to propose a feasible, indigenous model for bridging this gap. Specifically, the research pursues the following objectives:
To examine the conceptual and legal position of customs risk management within Iran’s anti-smuggling policy framework.
To assess the degree of alignment between Iran’s domestic laws, regulations, and institutional structures and the requirements of international customs instruments, particularly those developed by the WCO.
To identify the key legal, organizational, and technological gaps hindering the effective implementation of risk-based customs control.
To design a six-phase indigenous customs risk management model that is operationally feasible and legally compatible with Iran’s governance structure.
Research Methodology
This research adopts a descriptive–analytical methodology combined with a comparative approach. Data were collected through documentary analysis of domestic laws and regulations, policy documents, executive bylaws, and official reports related to customs control and anti-smuggling measures in Iran. Additionally, binding and non-binding international instruments issued by the World Customs Organization were systematically reviewed.
The comparative dimension focuses on evaluating Iran’s customs risk management framework against international benchmarks derived from the Revised Kyoto Convention, the SAFE Framework of Standards, and WCO risk management guidelines. Rather than engaging in a purely quantitative assessment, the study emphasizes qualitative institutional analysis, identifying patterns of convergence and divergence across legal, technological, and organizational dimensions.
Findings
The findings indicate that Iran’s customs system demonstrates a partial and formal alignment with international customs risk management standards at the policy and legislative levels. Several domestic regulations explicitly reference risk-based control, electronic data exchange, and trader profiling. However, this alignment remains largely superficial and insufficiently institutionalized. At the operational level, Iran’s customs risk management capacity can be characterized as lying within a “basic-to-intermediate” stage of maturity. The most significant deficiencies identified include:
The absence of a National Integrated Customs Risk Management Center responsible for centralized risk analysis and decision-making.
Weak and fragmented inter-agency data exchange mechanisms, particularly between customs, law enforcement, and regulatory bodies.
Limited analytical capacity and insufficient specialization of human resources in risk modeling, data mining, and advanced targeting techniques.
Lack of integrated technological architecture capable of supporting real-time risk assessment and automated selectivity.
Based on these findings, the study proposes an indigenous six-phase customs risk management model, consisting of:
Institutional recognition and preparatory capacity-building
Conceptual design and legal alignment
System and data architecture development
Pilot implementation
Nationwide deployment
Continuous monitoring and improvement.
This model is structurally aligned with the WCO risk management cycle while remaining adaptable to Iran’s legal system and administrative realities.
Conclusion
The study concludes that effective implementation of customs risk management in Iran requires moving beyond formal legal adoption toward deep institutionalization of risk-based governance. Establishing a centralized national risk management center, strengthening legal frameworks for real-time data exchange, investing in human capital development, and ensuring technological integration are essential prerequisites for success. If fully implemented, the proposed indigenous model can significantly enhance the efficiency of smuggling detection, reduce unnecessary inspections, lower transaction costs for low-risk traders, and strengthen trust between customs authorities and economic operators. Ultimately, aligning Iran’s customs system with advanced risk management practices can contribute to sustainable trade facilitation while reinforcing national economic security.
General and exclusive criminal law
Ehsan Yavari; Javad Riahi; Abolfazl Soleimani
Abstract
Problem Statement and Literature ReviewOne of the fundamental debates in criminal law is elucidating the relationship between the conditions of criminal responsibility and the constituent elements of crime. According to Article 140 of the Islamic Penal Code adopted in 2013, criminal responsibility in ...
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Problem Statement and Literature ReviewOne of the fundamental debates in criminal law is elucidating the relationship between the conditions of criminal responsibility and the constituent elements of crime. According to Article 140 of the Islamic Penal Code adopted in 2013, criminal responsibility in Hodud (fixed punishments), Qisas (retribution), and Ta'zirat (discretionary punishments) is realized only if the perpetrator was sane, adult (reached the age of legal responsibility), and acting of their own free will at the time of committing the crime. The legislator has introduced these three elements as "conditions of criminal responsibility." However, a detailed examination of the material and mental elements of crime clearly demonstrates that the realization of these elements itself requires the existence of these same three conditions; in such a way that the absence of any of them undermines one of the pillars of the crime, and fundamentally, no crime is committed.This issue has been examined from various perspectives in previous research. Jafari (2022), emphasizing the theory of the crime being composed of two pillars, considered the causal relationship as an independent component alongside the elements of crime. Gholami (2013), by distinguishing between "criminal capacity" and "commission of a crime," regarded factors negating capacity as obstacles to criminal responsibility. Ghamashi (2024), by providing a broad definition of fault, classified obstacles to responsibility among the impediments to the realization of fault and the crime itself. Furthermore, Milani and Abdolkarimi (2015), by accepting the two-pillar theory of crime, justified the possibility of establishing criminal responsibility without fault in specific cases. The lack of research that addresses this issue with an integrated approach, emphasizing the fundamental role of sanity, adulthood, and free will in the realization of the elements of crime, highlights the necessity of the present study.Research ObjectiveThe present study aims to elucidate the logical connection between the three conditions of criminal responsibility (sanity, adulthood, and free will) and the constituent elements of crime, and to prove the claim that what gives rise to criminal responsibility is solely the components forming the main elements of the crime, and establishing conditions beyond proving the three elements of the crime is unnecessary for imposing criminal responsibility. This research seeks to critique the prevailing views that consider these conditions as external to the elements of crime and demonstrate that sanity, adulthood, and free will function not as independent and subsequent conditions, but as prerequisites for the realization of the elements of crime (particularly the mental element and the attributability of the material element).MethodologyThis research employed a descriptive-analytical method using library and documentary sources. Initially, through a detailed examination of legal provisions, especially the Islamic Penal Code adopted in 2013, the concept of criminal responsibility and its conditions were analyzed. Subsequently, by studying and critiquing the opinions and theories of jurists in this field, the relationship between the aforementioned conditions and the elements of crime was scrutinized. In this process, an attempt was made, with a granular approach and by separating the components of the mental element (including knowledge of the subject, knowledge of the law, will, and criminal intent), to explain the fundamental role of sanity, adulthood, and free will in the realization of each of these components.FindingsThe investigations conducted reveal that:Sanity and adulthood act as prerequisites for the formation of criminal intent and knowledge of the subject of the crime; without them, the mental element of the crime is not realized. An individual lacking sanity or adulthood lacks the necessary capacity for the formation of criminal intent.Free will is an essential condition for attributing the material element of the crime to the perpetrator. In cases lacking free will (such as duress, coercion, necessity, or instantaneous insanity), the material element of the crime is either not attributable to the perpetrator at all or must be attributed to a more influential factor (such as the coercer).Concepts such as duress, insanity, minority, and severe mental disorders, contrary to the traditional view that considers them merely as "factors negating responsibility," are in fact factors that undermine the elements of the crime.In provisions such as Articles 151 and 153 of the Islamic Penal Code, by using the phrase "shall not be punished" (and not "a crime is not committed"), the legislator has incorrectly considered the absence of responsibility conditions merely as a cause for non-application of punishment, whereas in these cases, a crime has fundamentally not occurred.ConclusionThe analyses conducted in this research confirm that sanity, adulthood, and free will, despite being mentioned in Article 140 of the Islamic Penal Code as "conditions of criminal responsibility," actually play a foundational and fundamental role in the realization of the elements of crime. Without these three conditions, the mental and material elements of the crime remain undermined, and essentially, no crime is established to necessitate the examination of criminal responsibility. Therefore, the traditional perception of these concepts as conditions external to the elements of crime leads to fallacies in criminal analysis and sometimes to unjust verdicts. Accordingly, it is proposed that the legislator, in revising Article 140, replace the term "conditions of criminal responsibility" with "necessary conditions for the realization of the elements of crime," or at least explicitly state that these conditions should be considered in the analysis of the material and mental elements of crime. It is also essential for judicial authorities to examine these three conditions prior to the final determination of the crime, not after it. This conceptual and procedural reform could be considered an important step towards criminal justice and a more accurate interpretation of penal laws.By identifying the theoretical gap in distinguishing between the conditions for the realization of a crime and the conditions for criminal responsibility, this research presents a novel analytical model that can serve as a basis for legislative revision and judicial practice. An important achievement of this study is providing a coherent framework for classifying factors negating a crime into two groups: "factors undermining the mental element" (such as insanity and minority) and "factors undermining the attributability of the material element" (such as duress and necessity), which, while resolving theoretical ambiguities, facilitates the practical application of legal provisions for judges.
Criminal law and criminology
Ahmad Mozafari
Abstract
Introduction
Alternative Custodial sanctions are a type of leniency policy in which emphasis is placed on avoiding excessive punitive measures, such as imprisonment, and on placing the offender within the community environment for behavioral and normative re-education. In fact, alternative punishments ...
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Introduction
Alternative Custodial sanctions are a type of leniency policy in which emphasis is placed on avoiding excessive punitive measures, such as imprisonment, and on placing the offender within the community environment for behavioral and normative re-education. In fact, alternative punishments to imprisonment primarily aim to avoid excessive reliance on incarceration, and it is mainly for this reason that they have attracted the attention of lawmakers in various countries under such a Title. The Alternatives to Imprisonment Policy is a Mitigation program that attempts to reduce the quantitative and qualitative Harms of imprisonment for Various Crimes. Of course, this policy not exclusively implemented in the case of imprisonment, but it has been shown in the case of imprisonment more than any other area. At first, we must have a brief understanding of these measures. This understanding helps to overcome the theoretical obstacles to the expansion of these measures. In fact, the policy of alternatives to imprisonment is a common axis in criminological and criminal studies.
Research Objective
The philosophy of alternative punishments is that it is no longer possible, through traditional and classical sanctions, to provide the means for rehabilitating offenders and achieving targeted crime prevention. Therefore, it is necessary, alongside such measures and in order to moderate them, to draw on new approaches and methods within the broader framework of the criminal justice system and to create a space in which legal and judicial transformation and development can be pursued.
Methodology
In terms of intellectual foundations and origins, alternative measures have a clear association with the teachings of reductionist criminology and the policy of minimalization and reduction of the scope of criminal law.
Findings
Today, it is claimed that measures such as requiring convicts to perform community service, pay daily fines, or serve home confinement along with restrictions on traveling to certain areas and place, are among the best forms of punishment—at least for certain categories of offender—as they not only serve the purpose of social defense but also assist in the behavioral rehabilitation of the convict. Therefore, in justifying alternative punishments to imprisonment, it can be argued that such measures possess both legal aspects and multiple criminological functions, primarily aimed at enhancing the quality of the criminal justice system.
Conclusion
From the perspective of representing Iran's punitive policy approach to alternative measures, what is most apparent is that neither all forms of these policies have been fully utilized, nor have the existing regulations in the penal code been able to provide an environment for their maximum implementation. In terms of nature and content, it must be noted that alternative measures should never be construed as an exit from the realm of criminal justice; rather, they are a specific part of it... and should continue to be regarded as a form of punishment.
International Criminal
ABBAS Faghih; ABBAS Barzegarzadeh; Maryam Safae
Abstract
Introduction
The emergence of cryptocurrency as a major innovation in modern financial regulation and blockchain technology has introduced significant challenges for legal systems seeking to control digital assets and prevent financial crimes such as money laundering. This study conducts a comparative ...
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Introduction
The emergence of cryptocurrency as a major innovation in modern financial regulation and blockchain technology has introduced significant challenges for legal systems seeking to control digital assets and prevent financial crimes such as money laundering. This study conducts a comparative analysis of the criminal policy approaches of the United States and Iran in regulating cryptocurrencies, examining how each country addresses risks associated with money laundering, terrorist financing, and illicit financial activities within the blockchain ecosystem. In the United States, a multilayered system of financial regulation and oversight—implemented by agencies such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)—has created a relatively coherent framework for monitoring cryptocurrency transactions. These institutions apply advanced regulatory instruments to track crypto related crimes and manage threats associated with money laundering and unlawful use of blockchain based assets. In contrast, Iran follows a more restrictive and cautious criminal policy toward cryptocurrency, focusing primarily on controlling transactions and preventing currency misuse within its financial system. Despite this approach, Iran continues to face substantial regulatory gaps due to limitations in financial regulation, insufficient blockchain related technology, and the absence of an integrated legal structure. The findings show that Iran must reform its criminal policy and strengthen its financial regulation mechanisms by investing in intelligent supervisory systems linked to blockchain technology. Such improvements are crucial to ensuring the safe use of cryptocurrency and effectively addressing challenges such as money laundering. The study ultimately highlights the importance of international cooperation and comparative criminal policy strategies between countries like the United States and Iran in responding to the global rise of cryptocurrency.
Objective
This study was conducted with the aim of comparatively analyzing the criminal and regulatory policies of the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran in addressing cryptocurrencies, particularly in the areas of anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF). The central research problem is that cryptocurrencies, due to features such as decentralization, rapid cross-border transferability, and the difficulty of identifying users’ real identities, simultaneously possess significant capacity for financial innovation and criminal misuse. Within this framework, the study seeks to demonstrate how the two legal systems under review have understood, classified, and regulated this phenomenon, and what differences exist between them in terms of institution-building, legislation, supervisory tools, consumer protection, and international engagement. In addition, the applied objective of the research is to provide a clear picture of the strengths and weaknesses of Iran’s criminal policy in comparison with the U.S. model, so that policy recommendations may be formulated for reforming Iran’s legal structure and enhancing its regulatory capacity. Ultimately, the study aims to answer the question of what type of criminal and regulatory policymaking could enable Iran—while observing religious-jurisprudential and security considerations—to safely utilize the capacities of cryptocurrencies.
Methodology
This research is a comparative-analytical study and, in terms of purpose, an applied one. The research data were collected through library-based and documentary methods and include domestic laws and regulations of Iran and the United States, official reports issued by supervisory authorities, international instruments, and prior scholarly studies. In the U.S. section, the analysis focuses on the role of institutions such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In the Iran section, the Anti-Money Laundering Law, directives and policy positions of the Central Bank, policies related to cryptocurrency mining, and relevant executive and judicial practices were examined. In addition, transnational instruments and standards—such as the FATF Recommendations and emerging regulatory models (including the European Union experience)—were considered as supplementary comparative benchmarks. Data were analyzed using the method of qualitative content analysis, and the legal and policy texts were classified and compared across four principal dimensions: (1) institutional regulatory structures, (2) legal AML frameworks, (3) technical and legal challenges in identifying and prosecuting cryptocurrency-related crimes, and (4) the degree of alignment with international rules and cooperation mechanisms. The temporal scope of the study primarily covers the past decade (2013–2024), a period during which cryptocurrencies evolved from a marginal technology into a central subject of financial and criminal policymaking.
Findings
The findings indicate that, despite the absence of a comprehensive and unified federal statute on cryptocurrencies, the United States has been able to establish a relatively effective operational regulatory model through a specialized multi-agency structure. Under this model, each agency addresses a distinct aspect of the issue: FinCEN focuses on AML requirements and suspicious transaction reporting; the SEC addresses the securities-law dimensions of certain tokens; the CFTC supervises assets that may be treated as commodities and their derivatives markets; and the IRS concentrates on tax implications. This institutional architecture has enabled the United States to employ tools such as customer due diligence/identity verification, financial reporting obligations, blockchain analytics, and cooperation with exchanges to detect criminal patterns. At the same time, the findings show that the U.S. system also faces serious challenges, including jurisdictional overlap among agencies, inconsistencies between state and federal regulations, ambiguity in the legal characterization of certain digital assets (e.g., the distinction between “securities” and “commodities”), and the relative lag of legislation behind technological developments (such as DeFi, smart contracts, and stablecoins).
In contrast, Iran has adopted a cautious, restrictive, and partly reactive approach. Under Iran’s official policy, the use of cryptocurrencies as a domestic means of payment is prohibited; however, cryptocurrency mining is recognized under licensing and specific conditions, and in certain cases the use of cryptocurrency for financing imports has also been permitted. This dual-track approach, combined with the absence of a comprehensive law, has produced an ambiguous and at times contradictory legal status. The findings show that Iran’s challenges are not merely legislative; they also involve technical, institutional, and even jurisprudential (fiqh-based) dimensions: the absence of a clear legal classification of cryptocurrencies, the lack of a specialized central regulatory body, severe limitations in access to blockchain analytics tools (especially due to sanctions), weak legal protection for consumers, and jurisprudential disagreements regarding the legitimacy of cryptocurrency ownership and transactions. Moreover, although Iran’s Anti-Money Laundering Law and its amendments have constituted important steps toward alignment with global standards, this framework was designed primarily for the traditional financial system and does not adequately address the specific features of blockchain-based assets. As a result, Iran’s cryptocurrency space has, in practice, shifted toward semi-formal or informal activity, increasing the risks of fraud, capital flight, and difficulties in criminal prosecution.
Originality (Value)
The principal innovation of this research is that it does not merely describe the legal status of cryptocurrencies; rather, it adopts an integrated analytical approach that places “criminal policy,” “financial regulation,” “technological infrastructure,” “jurisprudential considerations,” and “geopolitical/sanctions-related conditions” within a single framework. This combination generates significant added value, particularly in the case of Iran, because it demonstrates that the inefficiency of cryptocurrency policymaking is not caused solely by the absence of legislation, but is instead the concurrent product of institutional fragmentation, weak technical tools, ambiguity in legal and jurisprudential concepts, and restricted international engagement. Another contribution of the study lies in extracting concrete policy implications for Iran from a comparison with the U.S. experience—without advocating a simplistic transplantation of the American model. The study shows that the appropriate model for Iran must be indigenous, multi-layered, and grounded in the country’s actual capacities; a model in which legislation, institution-building, regulatory technology, and a jurisprudential annex are all addressed simultaneously. In this respect, the present research can provide a suitable conceptual and applied foundation for legal scholars and criminologists, financial policymakers, and judicial and supervisory authorities alike.
Conclusion
Based on the results of the comparative analysis, it may be concluded that success in cryptocurrency regulation and anti-money laundering enforcement depends less on the “intensity of restriction” and more on the “quality of governance”; namely, the existence of specialized institutions, clear rules, reliable technical tools, and mechanisms for national and international coordination. Despite institutional shortcomings and inter-agency disagreements, the United States, by virtue of its strong institutional and technological capacity, has succeeded in establishing a relatively coherent framework for monitoring and controlling cryptocurrency-related crimes. Iran, however, due to the absence of a comprehensive law, the lack of a clearly designated central authority, ambiguity in the legal and jurisprudential status of cryptocurrencies, weak supervisory infrastructure, and sanctions-related constraints, remains in a more vulnerable position. Accordingly, several fundamental measures are necessary to improve Iran’s criminal policy and cryptocurrency regulation: adopting a comprehensive cryptocurrency law with precise definitions of concepts and responsibilities; establishing or designating a specialized central authority for digital-asset regulation; strengthening the Financial Intelligence Unit and mandating effective cooperation by domestic exchanges with AML mechanisms; investing in the development of indigenous blockchain analytics tools and in specialized training for judges, law enforcement officers, and experts; and designing regional or international cooperation models suited to existing political constraints. In addition, clarifying the legal and functional relationship between the “Digital Rial (Ramzrial)” and other forms of digital assets, and clearly distinguishing it from decentralized cryptocurrencies, is crucial to prevent conceptual and policy confusion. Overall, cryptocurrencies are not a temporary phenomenon but part of the structural reality of the future digital economy; therefore, delay in coherent, technology-oriented policymaking in Iran may have serious consequences for economic security, financial transparency, and public trust.
