نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار گروه حقوق، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی ، دانشگاه رازی، کرمانشاه، ایران
چکیده
نقش مؤثر مجنیعلیه در پیدایش بسیاری از جنایات زمینهساز تأسیس «عذر برانگیختگی» شده است؛ نهادی که مبتنیبر دو رویکرد ذهنی یا عینی - به صورت منفرد یا ترکیبی- شکل گرفته و در قوانین بسیاری از کشورها یکی از معاذیر قانونی یا قضایی برای کاهش مجازات قتل عمد شمرده شده است. دیدگاه رافع مسئولیت بهسبب اختلال در عنصر روانی، تقصیر و مجازات جانی را کمتر از قاتلی که با خونسردی کشته، قلمداد کرده است؛ اما درمورد سلب خویشتنداری ناشی از تعصبات جنسی یا قومیتی پاسخ روشنی برای مسئولیت جانی ارائه نمیدهد. دیدگاه علل موجهه نیز متکی بر خطای بزهدیده، به دنبال توجیه جزئی رفتار جانی در قتل بوده است که از نظر اندیشمندان حقوقی، این توجیه مورد پذیرش نیست. نگرش ترکیبی از دو رویکرد نیز نتوانسته پس از گذشت چندین سده، قانون جدید انگلستان را بر پایۀ یک نظریۀ متقن توجیه کند؛ ازاینرو، این نگارش درصدد است به روش توصیفی تحلیلی و مبنیبر «قاعدۀ اعتدای مجنیعلیه» نشان دهد راهحل انحصاری بهمنظور پاسخ به چالشهای نظری عذر تحریک، ایجاد سهمی از مجازات برای مجنیعلیه همچون نظریۀ «قصاص» در حقوق اسلامی است. بهموجب این قاعده، مجنیعلیه در صورتی دارای حقّ قصاص است که خود آغازگر تعدی و عامل تحریک جانی نباشد.
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
The Abolition of Qisas as a Way Out of the Theoretical Challenges of Provocation
نویسنده [English]
- Habib Soryani
Assistant professor Department of Law, Faculty of literature and Islamic sciences university, Razi university, Kermanshah, Iran.
چکیده [English]
The victim’s effective role in the occurrence of many crimes has given rise to the defense of provocation, based on either subjective or objective approaches, and has been regarded as one of the mitigating factors that reduces murder to manslaughter. As a partial excuse, it assumes that the conduct of a killer who acts under a mental disturbance is less blameworthy than that of one who kills in cold blood. However, in cases involving loss of self-control arising from sexual or ethnic prejudice, the doctrine fails to offer a clear and consistent basis for determining criminal liability. This has led proponents of the subjective approach to attempt to articulate justifications for the loss of self-control—justifications that have ultimately struggled to sustain the theory. For instance, how can one meaningfully distinguish between a situation in which a parent kills the perpetrator immediately after witnessing the rape and murder of their child and a situation in which the same parent confronts the murderer in court and kills him there? In both instances, the emotional disturbance is rooted in the same cruelty, yet the law draws unclear lines between them.
Similarly, in cases involving sexual infidelity, there remains the question of whether the emotional arousal triggered by discovering an act of infidelity constitutes unreasonable or unjustified excitement, and thus whether it should be excluded from mitigation. Moreover, the personality characteristics of defendants have long been debated in assessing the reasonableness of their reactions. The English Homicide Act of 1957, which relied on the subjective theory, was repeatedly criticized by legal scholars for precisely these ambiguities until major reforms to the defense of provocation were introduced in 2009.
As a partial justification, the provocation doctrine attempts to take account of the victim’s conduct in order to reduce the offender’s blameworthiness. Yet a killing committed outside the heat of passion remains unjustified. In the objective approach, victimologists have emphasized “provocation” as the victim’s influential role, particularly in violent crimes—suggesting, in effect, that the victim’s contribution to the incident partially diminishes the offender’s responsibility. Under this view, the offender’s conduct is partially justified because it is seen as a reaction to the victim’s fault.
Nonetheless, many legal scholars, particularly contemporary ones, maintain that murder cannot be justified solely on the basis of provocation. Even if the victim’s behavior is immoral or cruel, does this render the victim’s life less deserving of legal protection? If the central criterion is the victim’s wrongful conduct, why should a third party not be permitted to invoke the same excuse? And in the modern era, can it truly be justified for an “honorable person” to resort to personal violence—essentially private justice—even to defend dignity, without resorting to judicial mechanisms?
The combined approach, incorporating both subjective and objective elements, also failed to transform the reformed English law of 2009 into a coherent and durable doctrine. In addition to earlier problems, the new law raises fresh issues: Why are only age and gender included among relevant personal characteristics? Why is no direct connection made between emotional states and behavior, despite psychological evidence showing that individuals suffering severe emotional disturbances often make impulsive, poorly assessed decisions? Furthermore, there is no strong justification for limiting the victim’s role to only risky or violent behavior or speech. Because of these theoretical difficulties, the laws of the United States, France, England, and Canada have all undergone substantial change regarding provocation.
This article, using a descriptive–analytical approach, argues that the only effective solution to the theoretical problems surrounding provocation—when based on the “victim’s aggressive act”—is to allocate a share of liability to the victim. This aligns with the theory of Qisas in Islamic law. According to the findings of this study, the victim forfeits the right to Qisas if they initiated the aggression or provocation.
A reexamination of various traditions (such as Sahih Sulayman b. Khalid and Sahih al-Halabi) offers a new interpretive perspective: Qisas may be abolished when the victim’s conduct constitutes effective provocation. This interpretation supports the establishment of a new doctrinal rule, which may be termed the “Victim’s Aggression Rule.” In light of this research, it is necessary to add a provision to the general conditions of Qisas stating that the victim will not have the right to retribution if he initiated the aggression and provocation.
In such cases, the killing remains intentional and is still classified as intentional homicide. The offender must pay diyah (blood money) and receives the ta‘zir punishment associated with intentional killing. However, abolishing the right of Qisas would encourage individuals to refrain from aggressive behavior and to avoid provoking others in ways likely to lead to violence
کلیدواژهها [English]
- Abolition of Qisas
- Provocation
- Partial Justification
- Partial Excuse
- The rule of the victim's aggressive act
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