Journal of Criminal Law Research

Abstract Introduction
Iran’s banking system plays a decisive and structurally dominant role in the country’s economy. In the absence of a fully developed and efficient capital market capable of independently financing large-scale productive and commercial activities, banks shoulder the principal responsibility for funding both public and private sectors. Through the allocation of credit facilities and loans, they effectively determine the flow of liquidity, shape patterns of investment, and influence the distribution of national resources. Their decisions directly affect economic growth, financial stability, and public confidence in the monetary system. This central role means that granting credit facilities and loans is not merely a contractual or managerial matter, but an issue with wider social, economic, and legal implications. Against this backdrop, the present study aimed to examine whether banks can incur criminal liability for granting credit facilities and loans without adequate guarantees, and whether imposing such liability is legally and normatively defensible under Iranian law.
Materials and Methods
The current research adopted a descriptive–analytical approach grounded in documentary analysis. The sources analyzed included statutory provisions, doctrines, and scholarly writings on the criminal liability of banks. The analysis began by tracing the evolution of criminal law from a strictly individualistic system to a modern framework that recognizes the criminal liability of legal persons. In this respect, the analysis devoted particular attention to Article 143 of the Islamic Penal Code of 2013, which provides that legal entities may be held criminally liable when their legal representatives commit crimes in the name of, or in furtherance of the interests of, the entity. This provision reflects a significant normative shift and provides a legal foundation for assessing the responsibility of banks as corporate actors within the criminal justice system.
Moreover, the study examined several doctrines and theories that justify the attribution of criminal liability to legal persons. In this regard, the identification theory posits that the actions and intent of senior management constitute those of the corporation itself. Accordingly, when individuals functioning as the directing mind of an institution engage in unlawful conduct, their mental state and actions are imputed directly to the entity. Conversely, the doctrine of superior responsibility emphasizes failures in oversight and control, suggesting that inadequate supervision alone may establish grounds for liability. Finally, the organizational liability model adopts a broader approach by focusing on structural and systemic deficiencies, recognizing that wrongdoing in complex organizations often arises not from isolated acts, but from embedded practices, flawed incentive structures, or compliance failures. These theoretical frameworks were subsequently applied to the context of banking operations, specifically the procedures governing the approval and granting of credit facilities and loans.
Results and Discussion
Under certain conditions, granting credit facilities and loans without adequate guarantees can expose a bank—as a legal entity—to criminal liability. It is important to note that poor judgment or mere economic loss does not inherently constitute criminal conduct. Instead, the threshold for criminal liability is crossed when the granting of unsecured or under-collateralized credit facilities and loans is accompanied by legally relevant fault, such as intentional misconduct, abuse of authority, collusion, or gross negligence that severely jeopardizes protected economic interests. When authorized representatives (e.g., board members or senior executives) approve such facilities in the bank’s name, and their conduct meets the criteria for a criminal offense, the conditions under Article 143 of the Islamic Penal Code of 2013 may be met. In such instances, liability is not limited to individual decision-makers; the bank itself may be held accountable as an independent subject of criminal law.
Moreover, even when individual intent is difficult to establish, organizational failures may provide a separate basis for liability. Systemic issues—such as weak internal controls, ineffective compliance, flawed credit assessments, or the deliberate tolerance of risky lending—often point to broader institutional failings. Modern approaches to corporate criminal liability increasingly recognize that misconduct often stems from structural incentives, managerial culture, or persistent supervisory deficiencies. Consequently, the absence of adequate guarantees may signal deeper shortcomings in governance and risk management, rather than an isolated managerial fault.
Beyond its legal feasibility, the recognition of criminal liability in such cases is supported by strong policy considerations. Deterrence plays a crucial role in financial regulation. Banks operate on the foundation of public trust; their stability and credibility are essential to economic order and social confidence. The prospect of criminal sanctions—whether fines, restrictions on operations, or other measures—creates a strong incentive for institutions to strengthen compliance frameworks, improve risk assessment procedures, and adhere strictly to professional and legal standards. Furthermore, effective enforcement requires holding entities accountable when individual liability alone would be insufficient. Given the complexity and hierarchical nature of banking structures, identifying a single responsible individual may be difficult. Limiting prosecution to natural persons may therefore undermine the preventive and compensatory functions of criminal law.
Irresponsible lending practices may also enable broader economic wrongdoing, including embezzlement, corruption, favoritism, and the misappropriation of public resources. In economies where banks dominate financial intermediation, the effects of such conduct extend well beyond private contractual disputes and can erode economic justice. Therefore, recognizing corporate criminal liability aligns with preventive criminal policy and anti-corruption objectives by strengthening accountability within key financial institutions and protecting the integrity of financial governance.
Conclusion
Granting credit facilities and loans without adequate guarantees is not a minor procedural lapse or a mere administrative irregularity. In the banking sector, guarantees—whether personal (e.g., suretyships) or proprietary (e.g., mortgages and pledged assets)—serve as fundamental safeguards against credit risk, which is widely recognized as one of the most significant risks facing financial institutions. Sound banking practice requires thorough assessment of borrowers’ financial capacity, careful evaluation of the sufficiency of collateral, and strict compliance with the regulatory standards governing credit allocation. When banks fail to observe these requirements, they expose not only themselves, but also depositors, shareholders, and the broader economy, to substantial harm. The current study concludes that holding banks criminally liable for granting credit facilities without adequate guarantees is both legally grounded and practically justified under the Iranian legal framework. The Islamic Penal Code provides a clear doctrinal basis for attributing criminal liability to legal persons when offences are committed in their name or for their benefit.

Abstract Introduction Goods smuggling is among the most persistent and structurally complex forms of economic crime, with far-reaching negative effects on national economic security, public revenues, market stability, and public trust in regulatory institutions. In recent decades, the globalization of trade, the growth of cross-border supply chains, and the rapid digitalization of logistics have fundamentally reshaped smuggling. Organized smuggling networks now increasingly employ sophisticated techniques, engage in regulatory arbitrage, and exploit institutional weaknesses—developments that have rendered many traditional customs control mechanisms less effective. Historically, customs administrations relied on manual physical inspections, random checks, and reactive enforcement strategies. However, international experience and criminological literature demonstrate that these approaches are inefficient, costly, and incompatible with the growing volume of global trade. Consequently, contemporary customs systems have transitioned toward customs risk management (CRM)—a data-driven, intelligence-led framework that enables the selective targeting of high-risk consignments while facilitating low-risk trade. At the international level, the World Customs Organization (WCO) has institutionalized risk-based customs control through key instruments such as the Revised Kyoto Convention, the SAFE Framework of Standards, and guidelines on Authorized Economic Operators (AEO). These instruments emphasize systematic risk identification, risk analysis, inter-institutional data exchange, and continuous monitoring. Numerous empirical studies confirm that effective CRM enhances enforcement efficiency, reduces transaction costs, and strengthens voluntary compliance. Despite formal commitments to international customs standards, Iran’s customs system continues to exhibit a significant gap between normative adoption of risk-management principles and their practical implementation. Iran’s geopolitical position, extensive land and maritime borders, and role as a regional transit corridor heighten its exposure to smuggling risks. Official statistics report tens of thousands of detected smuggling cases each year; however, seizure-based indicators suggest that only a small share of total smuggling flows is intercepted. This disparity points to structural deficiencies in risk identification, data integration, and institutional coordination. Existing Iranian scholarship has examined smuggling mainly through legal, criminological, and enforcement-oriented lenses. However, systematic analysis of CRM as a policy instrument—particularly through comparative assessment against international customs standards—remains limited. To address the gap, the present study aimed to examine the underlying causes of the implementation deficit and propose a localized, operational risk management model that would be compatible with Iran’s legal and institutional framework. The primary objective was to analyze the causes of the discrepancy between international CRM standards and their practical implementation within Iran’s customs system. Specifically, the present study sought to examine the conceptual and legal status of CRM within Iran’s anti-smuggling policy framework. It also intended to evaluate the extent to which domestic laws, regulations, and institutional arrangements align with the requirements of international customs instruments, particularly those developed by the WCO. Moreover, an attempt was made to identify the key legal, organizational, and technological deficiencies that impede effective risk-based customs control. Finally, the study developed a six-phase, localized CRM model that is both operationally feasible and legally compatible with Iran’s governance structure. Materials and Methods The current research employed a descriptive–analytical methodology combined with a comparative approach. The data was collected through documentary analysis of domestic laws and regulations, policy documents, executive bylaws, and official reports relating to customs control and anti-smuggling measures in Iran. In addition, both binding and non-binding international instruments issued by the WCO were systematically reviewed. The comparative dimension focused on evaluating Iran’s CRM framework against international standards derived from the Revised Kyoto Convention, the SAFE Framework of Standards, and the WCO risk management guidelines. Rather than engaging in a purely quantitative assessment, the study emphasized qualitative institutional analysis, identifying patterns of convergence and divergence across legal, technological, and organizational dimensions. Results and Discussion Iran’s customs system exhibits partial and largely formal alignment with international CRM standards at the policy and legislative levels. Several domestic regulations explicitly refer to risk-based control, electronic data exchange, and trader profiling. In practice, however, this alignment remains superficial and insufficiently institutionalized. At the operational level, Iran’s CRM capacity can be characterized as being at a basic-to-intermediate stage of maturity. The most salient deficiencies include: (1) the absence of a national integrated CRM center to provide centralized risk analysis and decision-making; (2) weak and fragmented inter-institutional data exchange mechanisms (particularly among customs, law-enforcement authorities, and regulatory bodies); (3) limited analytical capacity and inadequate human resource specialization in risk modelling, data mining, and advanced targeting techniques; and (4) the lack of an integrated technological architecture capable of supporting real-time risk assessment and automated selectivity. Building on these findings, the study proposed a six-phase, localized CRM model comprising institutional recognition and preparatory capacity-building, conceptual design and legal alignment, development of system and data architecture, pilot implementation, nationwide implementation, and continuous monitoring and improvement. The model is structurally consistent with the WCO risk management cycle while remaining adaptable to Iran’s legal framework and administrative realities. Conclusion The study concludes that effective implementation of CRM in Iran requires moving beyond the formal and legal adoption toward the deep institutionalization of risk-based governance. Establishing a centralized national risk management center, strengthening legal frameworks for real-time data exchange, investing in human capital development, and ensuring technological integration are essential prerequisites for success. If fully implemented, the proposed model could significantly enhance the efficiency of smuggling detection, reduce unnecessary inspections, lower transaction costs for low-risk traders, and strengthen trust between customs authorities and economic operators. Ultimately, aligning Iran’s customs system with advanced risk management practices can contribute to sustainable trade facilitation while reinforcing national economic security.

Abstract Introduction

One of the fundamental debates in criminal law concerns clarifying the relationship between the conditions of criminal responsibility and the constituent elements of crime. Under Article 140 of the Islamic Penal Code of 2013, criminal responsibility in cases of fixed punishments (ḥudūd), retaliation (qiṣāṣ), and discretionary punishments (ta’zīrāt) arises only when the offender, at the time of committing the offense, was sane, had reached the age of legal responsibility, and acted of their own volition. The legislator has identified these three elements as the conditions of criminal responsibility. However, a close examination of the material and mental elements of a crime clearly shows that their realization itself depends on the existence of these same three conditions. In other words, the absence of any one of them undermines one of the essential pillars of the offense, such that, fundamentally, no crime is committed.

Previous research shows that there is no single view on the relationship between criminal responsibility and the conditions of crime. The literature reveals a fragmented picture and a lack of a unified analysis of how these conditions affect the realization of crime. It is thus necessary to address the issue through an integrated approach, with particular emphasis on the role of sanity, maturity, and volition in the realization of the elements of crime. In this respect, the present study aimed to clarify the logical relationship between the three conditions of criminal responsibility (i.e., sanity, maturity, and volition) and the constituent elements of crime. It sought to demonstrate that criminal responsibility arises solely from the components that constitute the essential elements of the offense, and that, once the three elements of the crime are established, no additional conditions need to be proven in order to impose criminal responsibility. The study also offered a critique of the prevailing view that treats these conditions as external to the elements of crime, arguing instead that sanity, maturity, and volition are not independent and subsequent conditions but prerequisites for the realization of the elements of the crime, particularly the mental element and the attributability of the material element.

Materials and Methods

This research adopted a descriptive–analytical approach based on library and documentary sources. It began with a detailed examination of legal provisions, particularly the Islamic Penal Code of 2013, to analyze the concept of criminal responsibility and its conditions. It then reviewed and critically assessed the opinions and theories of jurists in order to examine the relationship between these conditions and the elements of crime. In doing so, the analysis employed a granular approach, separating the components of the mental element (e.g.., knowledge of the facts, knowledge of the law, will, and criminal intent) to clarify the fundamental role of sanity, maturity, and volition in the realization of each element.

Results and Discussion

The analysis yielded several insights. First, sanity and maturity function as prerequisites for the formation of criminal intent and knowledge of the factual circumstances of the offense; without them, the mental element of the crime cannot be realized. A person who lacks sanity or has not reached maturity does not possess the necessary capacity for the formation of criminal intent. Second, volition is an essential condition for attributing the material element of the crime to the perpetrator. In situations where volition is absent (e.g., in cases of duress, coercion, necessity, or instantaneous insanity), the material element of the crime is either not attributable to the perpetrator at all or must instead be attributed to a more decisive factor, such as the coercing party.

The study further demonstrated that concepts such as duress, insanity, minority, and severe mental disorders should in fact be understood as factors that undermine the elements of the crime itself— contrary to the traditional view that treats them merely as factors negating responsibility. Moreover, in provisions such as Articles 151 and 153 of the Islamic Penal Code, the legislator—by using the phrase shall not be punished rather than stating that no crime has been committed—has incorrectly treated the absence of the conditions of responsibility merely as a ground for non-punishment, whereas in such cases the crime has, in principle, not occurred.

Conclusion

Although referred to in Article 140 of the Islamic Penal Code as conditions of criminal responsibility, sanity, maturity, and volition actually play a foundational and essential role in the realization of the elements of crime. In the absence of these three conditions, the mental and material elements of the offense are fundamentally deficient, and, in essence, no crime is established that would require an assessment of criminal responsibility. Therefore, the traditional view of these concepts as conditions external to the elements of crime gives rise to analytical fallacies in criminal law and, at times, to unjust judgments. Accordingly, it is proposed that, in revising Article 140, the legislator replace the term conditions of criminal responsibility with necessary conditions for the realization of the elements of crime, or at least explicitly clarify that these conditions must be taken into account in analyzing the material and mental elements of crime. It is also essential for judicial authorities to examine these three conditions before making a final determination as to the occurrence of a crime, rather than afterward. Such a conceptual and procedural reform could constitute an important step towards criminal justice and a more accurate interpretation of penal laws.

By identifying the theoretical gap between the conditions for the realization of crime and the conditions for criminal responsibility, this research proposed a novel analytical model that could serve as a foundation for legislative revision and judicial practice. A major contribution of this study is the development of a coherent framework for classifying crime-negating factors into two categories: (1) factors that undermine the mental element, such as insanity and minority; and (2) factors that undermine the attributability of the material element, such as duress and necessity. This framework not only resolves theoretical ambiguities but also facilitates the practical application of legal provisions by judges.

Abstract Introduction In contemporary legal systems, insurance has become one of the principal institutions responsible for the payment of blood money (diyah), particularly in cases involving traffic accidents and other bodily injuries. However, from a jurisprudential (fiqh-based) perspective, however, a fundamental question arises: If contracts are considered tawqīfī—that is, strictly limited to those explicitly recognized in Islamic law— under which classical nominate contract can the insurance contract be classified? The issue is especially significant in relation to the payment of blood money, because transferring liability from the direct offender to an insurance company requires a legitimate and valid juristic foundation. Several attempts have been made in Islamic jurisprudence to assimilate insurance into traditional contracts such as the guarantee (ḍamān), guarantee of allegiance (ḍamān al-jarīrah), gift with consideration (hiba muʿawaḍah), settlement (ṣulḥ), and other nominate contracts. Nevertheless, closer examination reveals that the nature and legal effects of the insurance contract do not fully correspond to any of these established types. In addition, doubts have been raised regarding the legality of insurance on grounds such as excessive uncertainty or risk (gharar), resemblance to gambling, and ambiguity in consideration. The complexity increases when examining the role of insurance across different categories of homicide and bodily injury, such as intentional crimes (ʿamd), quasi-intentional crimes (shibh al-ʿamd), and pure fault (khaṭāʾ maḥḍ). While insurance is widely accepted in quasi-intentional cases such as traffic accidents, its legitimacy in cases of intentional homicide remains controversial. Therefore, a comprehensive jurisprudential–legal analysis is required to examine the nature, rulings (aḥkām), and doubts (shubuhāt) surrounding the insurance contract and its function in the payment of blood money. This study aimed to provide a comprehensive jurisprudential–legal analysis of the insurance contract in relation to the payment of blood money, focusing on three main objectives. First, it sought to clarify the nature of the insurance contract and to determine whether it must be subsumed under traditional nominate contracts such as the guarantee (ḍamān) or gift (hiba), or whether it may be recognized as an independent contract on the basis of general principles of contractual validity. Second, it examined the rulings governing the insurer’s responsibility for the payment of blood money in intentional crimes, quasi-intentional rimes, and pure fault. Third, it intended to analyze the principal doubts raised against insurance—such as uncertainty, gambling, and ambiguity—and assess their validity. Ultimately, the study sought to demonstrate the jurisprudential legitimacy of insurance as a responsible institution in the payment of blood money, while proposing mechanisms for expanding and strengthening its role. Materials and Methods The current study employed a descriptive–analytical and doctrinal method rooted in Islamic jurisprudence and Iranian statutory law. It began by examining classical jurisprudential sources to analyze the relationship between the insurance contract and nominate contracts such as the guarantee (ḍamān), guarantee of allegiance (ḍamān al-jarīrah), and gift with consideration (hiba muʿawaḍah). The research then evaluated the applicability of general legal maxims and Quranic principles regarding the fulfillment of contracts. Furthermore, relevant provisions of Iranian law—including the Civil Code, the Islamic Penal Code, and the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance Act—were reviewed and examined. This comparative approach enabled an analysis of the compatibility between insurance, the payment of blood money, and the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Results and Discussion The findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the insurance contract cannot be fully assimilated into traditional nominate contracts such as the guarantee (ḍamān), as the classical guarantee pertains to an existing debt, whereas insurance involves a commitment to compensate for potential future harm. Similarly, the guarantee of allegiance (ḍamān al-jarīrah) differs substantially in nature, as it is predicated upon inheritance rights and specific relational structures that are absent in insurance. Moreover, the analogy with the gift with consideration (hiba muʿawaḍah) was found to be inadequate, as insurance entails mutually binding obligations and economic equivalence rather than a gratuitous transfer. It seems there is no convincing basis for subsuming insurance under a classical nominate contract. In addition, general contractual principles play a significant role, particularly the Quranic expression, “O you who believe, fulfill your contracts” (awfū bi-l-ʿuqūd; Quran 5:1), and the well-known Islamic saying, “Believers are bound by their conditions” (al-muʾminūn ʿinda shurūṭihim). Therefore, the insurance constitutes a valid and independent contract. Contracts in Islamic law are not confined to the classical nominate types, so the insurance contract is legitimate so long as it does not contravene any explicit prohibition. Second, main doubts surrounding the insurance contract are not tenable. The contention that insurance is void on account of excessive uncertainty or risk (gharar) is unfounded, because the subject matter of the contract is not the uncertain compensation itself but the legally defined undertaking of risk coverage and security provided by the insurer. Therefore, insurance is fundamentally distinct from gambling, as it is premised on risk management and compensation for harm rather than the pursuit of speculative gain. Thus, the main doubts raised against the legitimacy of insurance lack a sufficient jurisprudential basis. Third, the analysis yielded significant results about insurance and payment of blood money in different types of crimes. In quasi-intentional crimes (shibh al-ʿamd), insurance may clearly assume responsibility for paying the blood money, particularly in traffic accidents. This accords with statutory law and with the compensatory nature of blood money. In cases of pure fault (khaṭāʾ maḥḍ), although classical jurisprudence assigns liability to main relatives (ʿāqilah), there is no prohibition on the offender paying the blood money voluntarily. Therefore, allocating this obligation to an insurer by contract is permissible. On this basis, insurance may function in place of the main relative (ʿāqilah) and, in certain circumstances, even in place of the public treasury. With respect to intentional crimes (ʿamd), the prevailing view rejects insurance coverage on the ground that it may encourage wrongdoing and weaken deterrence. Nevertheless, blood money here remains compensatory rather than punitive, and the possibility of retaliation (qiṣāṣ) continues to operate as a deterrent. Therefore, there is theoretical scope for limited coverage, provided that strict regulatory safeguards are in place to prevent abuse. In light of the foregoing analysis, expanding insurers’ responsibility for paying the blood money promotes social justice, reduces imprisonment arising from inability to satisfy obligations, and ensures more timely and effective compensation for victims. Several measures can further improve the system’s effectiveness, such as strengthening compulsory insurance, reinforcing the Bodily Injuries Indemnification Fund, permitting post-accident insurance arrangements under strict regulatory oversight, expanding access to private insurance, and ensuring equal coverage for women and men. Conclusion According to the findings, the insurance contract is a valid and independent contract under Islamic jurisprudence and modern law. It need not be forced into the categorization of traditional nominate contracts such as the guarantee or gift. On the basis of general principles of contractual validity, insurance may be treated as a legitimate mechanism for transferring financial liability. With respect to the payment of blood money, insurance plays a central role in quasi-intentional (shibh al-ʿamd) and pure fault (khaṭāʾ maḥḍ) offenses and may, under appropriate regulatory conditions, also be considered in intentional (ʿamd) cases. Expanding the role of insurance in the payment of blood money enhances compensatory justice, strengthens support for victims, reduces incarceration resulting from an inability to pay the blood money. This also aligns with the objectives of Islamic law in protecting life, property, and social order. In sum, the jurisprudential flexibility of Islamic law allows the recognition of insurance as an essential institution within contemporary arrangements for paying the blood money, provided that its contractual structure and regulatory framework are designed to prevent abuse and preserve public order.

Abstract Introduction Alternative custodial sanctions are a form of leniency policy that emphasizes avoiding excessive punitive measures (e.g., imprisonment), and instead placing offenders within the community for behavioral and normative rehabilitation. In essence, alternatives to imprisonment are primarily intended to reduce excessive reliance on incarceration. It is largely for this reason that they have attracted the attention of lawmakers in many countries. The policy of alternatives to imprisonment constitutes a common focus in criminological and criminal justice studies. The philosophy underlying alternative punishments posits that traditional sanctions are no longer sufficient to rehabilitate offenders or achieve effective crime prevention. It is thus essential to integrate innovative approaches within the criminal justice framework to mitigate the limitations of classical measures and foster an environment conducive to legal and judicial transformation. The policy of alternatives to imprisonment is a mitigation plan aimed at reducing both the quantitative and qualitative harms of imprisonment for various crimes. In this respect, it is necessary to gain an understanding of these measures, which in turn can help overcome the theoretical obstacles to the development and expansion of such measures. Focusing on the relevant theories proposed in the field, the present research aimed to examine theoretical discourses on alternatives to imprisonment. It tried to answer the following research questions: What are intellectual and scientific foundations of criminological and penological theories about alternatives to imprisonment? And what are the limits of their validity, possible deliverability, and susceptibility to critique? Materials and Methods The current study used a descriptive–analytical approach. It drew on a qualitative thematic analysis to clarify theoretical discourses and shed light on historical trajectory, nature, foundations, and functions of alternatives to imprisonment. Results and Discussion In terms of its intellectual foundations and origins, alternative measures are closely associated with the principles of reductionist criminology and with policies aimed at minimizing and limiting the scope of criminal law. Today, measures such as community service, day fines, and home confinement, together with restrictions on travel to certain areas or places, are widely regarded as the most effective forms of punishment—at least for certain categories of offenders. They not only serve the goals of social defense but also contribute to the offender’s behavioral rehabilitation. Therefore, in justifying alternatives to imprisonment, it may be argued that such measures have both legal dimensions and multiple criminological functions, primarily aimed at improving the quality of the criminal justice system. Conclusion Concerning the approach of Iran’s penal policy toward alternative measures, it is evident that not all forms of these policies have been fully utilized, nor have the existing provisions of the Penal Code created a framework conducive to their optimal implementation. With regard to their nature and substance, alternative measures should by no means be construed as standing outside the sphere of criminal justice; rather, they constitute a distinct component of it and must continue to be recognized and applied as a form of punishment.

Abstract Introduction The emergence of cryptocurrency as a major innovation in modern financial regulation and blockchain technology has posed significant challenges for legal systems seeking to control digital assets and prevent financial crimes such as money laundering. The current study aimed to conduct a comparative analysis of the criminal policy approaches adopted by the United States and Iran in regulating cryptocurrencies, examining how each country addresses the risks of money laundering, terrorist financing, and other illicit financial activities within the blockchain ecosystem. Focusing on anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF), the study investigated how cryptocurrencies—due to features such as decentralization, rapid cross-border transferability, and the difficulty of reliably identifying users—offer substantial potential for financial innovation while also creating opportunities for criminal misuse. Against this backdrop, a comparative analysis was conducted to see how the two legal systems have conceptualized, categorized, and regulated cryptocurrencies, and to identify the key differences between them in institution-building, legislation, supervisory instruments, consumer protection, and international engagement. In addition, the applied objective of the research was to present a clear assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Iran’s criminal policy in comparison with the U.S. model, with a view to developing policy recommendations for reforming Iran’s legal framework and strengthening its regulatory capacity. Ultimately, the study sought to answer what form of criminal and regulatory policymaking could enable Iran—while respecting religious–jurisprudential and security considerations—to safely and effectively harness the potential of cryptocurrencies. Materials and Methods As a comparative–analytical inquiry, the current study relied on library and documentary research methods to collect the data from various sources, including domestic laws and regulations of Iran and the United States, official reports issued by supervisory authorities, international instruments, and existing scholarly literature. The analysis covered a ten-year period (2013 to 2024), a period in which cryptocurrencies evolved from a marginal technology into a central concern of financial regulation and criminal policymaking. Concerning the American context, the analysis focused on the role of key institutions, such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The analysis of the Iranian context took into account the Anti-Money Laundering Law, the Central Bank’s directives and policy positions, policies related to cryptocurrency mining, and relevant executive and judicial practices. In addition, transnational instruments and standards (e.g., the FATF Recommendations) and emerging regulatory approaches (e.g., the European Union’s experience) were also considered as supplementary comparative benchmarks. Using qualitative content analysis, the study categorized and compared relevant legal and policy materials across four core dimensions: (1) institutional regulatory structures; (2) AML legal frameworks; (3) technical and legal challenges in detecting, investigating, and prosecuting cryptocurrency-related crimes; and (4) the degree of alignment with international rules and cooperation mechanisms. Results and Discussion Despite the absence of a comprehensive, unified federal statute on cryptocurrencies, the United States has developed a relatively effective regulatory model in practice through a specialized, multi-agency structure. Under this model, each agency addresses a distinct aspect of the issue: FinCEN focuses on AML requirements and suspicious transaction reporting; the SEC addresses the securities-law dimensions of certain tokens; the CFTC supervises assets that may be treated as commodities and related derivatives markets; and the IRS deals with on tax implications. This institutional architecture enables the use of tools such as customer due diligence and identity verification, financial reporting obligations, blockchain analytics, and cooperation with exchanges to detect illicit patterns. However, as the findings showed, the U.S. system faces serious challenges, including overlapping agency jurisdictions, inconsistencies between state and federal regulations, ambiguity in the legal classification of certain digital assets (e.g., the distinction between securities and commodities), and the tendency of legislation to lag behind technological developments such as DeFi, smart contracts, and stablecoins. In contrast, Iran has adopted a cautious, restrictive, and partly reactive approach. Under Iran’s official policy, the use of cryptocurrencies as a domestic means of payment is prohibited; however, cryptocurrency mining is recognized under licensing and specific conditions, and in certain cases, the use of cryptocurrency for financing imports is also permitted. This dual-track approach, combined with the absence of a comprehensive law, has led to an ambiguous and at times contradictory legal status. Moreover, Iran’s challenges are not merely legislative; they also extend to technical, institutional, and even jurisprudential (fiqh-based) dimensions. The challenges include the absence of a clear legal classification of cryptocurrencies, the lack of a specialized central regulatory body, severe limitations in access to blockchain analytics tools (especially due to sanctions), weak consumer protection, and jurisprudential disagreements regarding the legitimacy of cryptocurrency ownership and transactions. Although Iran’s Anti-Money Laundering Law and its amendments represent important steps toward alignment with global standards, the framework is designed primarily for the traditional financial system and does not adequately address the specific features of blockchain-based assets. As a result, Iran’s cryptocurrency sector has in practice shifted toward semi-formal or informal activity, thereby increasing the risks of fraud, capital flight, and difficulties in criminal prosecution. The analysis went beyond describing the legal status of cryptocurrencies. Instead, it adopted an integrated analytical approach that brought criminal policy, financial regulation, technological infrastructure, jurisprudential considerations, and geopolitical or sanctions-related conditions into a single framework. This synthesis adds substantial value—particularly in the Iranian context—by showing that ineffective cryptocurrency policymaking cannot not attributed solely to the absence of legislation, but rather to the combined effects of institutional fragmentation, inadequate technical tools, ambiguity in legal and jurisprudential concepts, and restricted international engagement. A further contribution concerns concrete policy implications for Iran, derived from the comparison with the U.S. experience, while avoiding any simplistic transplantation of the American model. The analysis suggested that an appropriate framework for Iran be indigenous and multi-layered, reflecting the country’s actual capacities and incorporating legislation, institution-building, regulatory technology, and a jurisprudential annex. Conclusion Based on the comparative analysis, it can be concluded that success in cryptocurrency regulation and AML enforcement depends less on the severity of restrictions than on the quality of governance—specifically, the presence of specialized institutions, clear rules, reliable technical tools, and effective mechanisms for both domestic and international coordination. The study highlighted the importance of international cooperation and comparative criminal policy strategies between countries like the United States and Iran in responding to the global rise of cryptocurrency. Despite institutional shortcomings and inter-agency disagreements, the United States has succeeded in establishing a relatively coherent framework for monitoring and controlling cryptocurrency-related crimes. Iran, by contrast, remains in a more vulnerable position due to the absence of a comprehensive legal framework, the lack of a clearly designated central authority, ambiguity surrounding the legal and jurisprudential status of cryptocurrencies, weak supervisory infrastructure, and constraints arising from international sanctions. Accordingly, several fundamental measures are necessary to improve Iran’s criminal policy and cryptocurrency regulation. These measure include adopting a comprehensive cryptocurrency law with precise definitions of concepts and responsibilities; establishing or designating a specialized central authority for digital-asset regulation; strengthening the Financial Intelligence Unit and mandating effective cooperation by domestic exchanges with AML mechanisms; investing in the development of indigenous blockchain analytics tools and in specialized training for judges, law enforcement officers, and experts; and designing regional or international cooperation models suited to existing political constraints. In addition, preventing conceptual and policy confusion requires clarifying the legal and functional relationship between the Digital Rial (Ramzrial) and other forms of digital assets, and clearly distinguishing it from decentralized cryptocurrencies. Overall, cryptocurrencies are not a temporary phenomenon but part of the structural reality of the future digital economy. Therefore, any delay in adopting coherent, technology-oriented policymaking in Iran may have serious consequences for economic security, financial transparency, and public trust.