Philosophy of criminal law
Habib Soryani
Abstract
The victim’s effective role in the occurrence of many crimes has given rise to the defense of provocation, based on either subjective or objective approaches, and has been regarded as one of the mitigating factors that reduces murder to manslaughter. As a partial excuse, it assumes that the conduct ...
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The victim’s effective role in the occurrence of many crimes has given rise to the defense of provocation, based on either subjective or objective approaches, and has been regarded as one of the mitigating factors that reduces murder to manslaughter. As a partial excuse, it assumes that the conduct of a killer who acts under a mental disturbance is less blameworthy than that of one who kills in cold blood. However, in cases involving loss of self-control arising from sexual or ethnic prejudice, the doctrine fails to offer a clear and consistent basis for determining criminal liability. This has led proponents of the subjective approach to attempt to articulate justifications for the loss of self-control—justifications that have ultimately struggled to sustain the theory. For instance, how can one meaningfully distinguish between a situation in which a parent kills the perpetrator immediately after witnessing the rape and murder of their child and a situation in which the same parent confronts the murderer in court and kills him there? In both instances, the emotional disturbance is rooted in the same cruelty, yet the law draws unclear lines between them.
Similarly, in cases involving sexual infidelity, there remains the question of whether the emotional arousal triggered by discovering an act of infidelity constitutes unreasonable or unjustified excitement, and thus whether it should be excluded from mitigation. Moreover, the personality characteristics of defendants have long been debated in assessing the reasonableness of their reactions. The English Homicide Act of 1957, which relied on the subjective theory, was repeatedly criticized by legal scholars for precisely these ambiguities until major reforms to the defense of provocation were introduced in 2009.
As a partial justification, the provocation doctrine attempts to take account of the victim’s conduct in order to reduce the offender’s blameworthiness. Yet a killing committed outside the heat of passion remains unjustified. In the objective approach, victimologists have emphasized “provocation” as the victim’s influential role, particularly in violent crimes—suggesting, in effect, that the victim’s contribution to the incident partially diminishes the offender’s responsibility. Under this view, the offender’s conduct is partially justified because it is seen as a reaction to the victim’s fault.
Nonetheless, many legal scholars, particularly contemporary ones, maintain that murder cannot be justified solely on the basis of provocation. Even if the victim’s behavior is immoral or cruel, does this render the victim’s life less deserving of legal protection? If the central criterion is the victim’s wrongful conduct, why should a third party not be permitted to invoke the same excuse? And in the modern era, can it truly be justified for an “honorable person” to resort to personal violence—essentially private justice—even to defend dignity, without resorting to judicial mechanisms?
The combined approach, incorporating both subjective and objective elements, also failed to transform the reformed English law of 2009 into a coherent and durable doctrine. In addition to earlier problems, the new law raises fresh issues: Why are only age and gender included among relevant personal characteristics? Why is no direct connection made between emotional states and behavior, despite psychological evidence showing that individuals suffering severe emotional disturbances often make impulsive, poorly assessed decisions? Furthermore, there is no strong justification for limiting the victim’s role to only risky or violent behavior or speech. Because of these theoretical difficulties, the laws of the United States, France, England, and Canada have all undergone substantial change regarding provocation.
This article, using a descriptive–analytical approach, argues that the only effective solution to the theoretical problems surrounding provocation—when based on the “victim’s aggressive act”—is to allocate a share of liability to the victim. This aligns with the theory of Qisas in Islamic law. According to the findings of this study, the victim forfeits the right to Qisas if they initiated the aggression or provocation.
A reexamination of various traditions (such as Sahih Sulayman b. Khalid and Sahih al-Halabi) offers a new interpretive perspective: Qisas may be abolished when the victim’s conduct constitutes effective provocation. This interpretation supports the establishment of a new doctrinal rule, which may be termed the “Victim’s Aggression Rule.” In light of this research, it is necessary to add a provision to the general conditions of Qisas stating that the victim will not have the right to retribution if he initiated the aggression and provocation.
In such cases, the killing remains intentional and is still classified as intentional homicide. The offender must pay diyah (blood money) and receives the ta‘zir punishment associated with intentional killing. However, abolishing the right of Qisas would encourage individuals to refrain from aggressive behavior and to avoid provoking others in ways likely to lead to violence
Criminal law and criminology
Reza Abolhassani; Tahmoores Bashirieh; mahdi yousefi sadeghloo
Abstract
Over the past century, sport has increasingly become a significant arena of scholarly inquiry within the humanities and social sciences. Growing recognition of its social, cultural, political, and economic importance has led to the development of specialized subfields such as sports sociology, sports ...
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Over the past century, sport has increasingly become a significant arena of scholarly inquiry within the humanities and social sciences. Growing recognition of its social, cultural, political, and economic importance has led to the development of specialized subfields such as sports sociology, sports geography, sports history, sports law, sports politics, the political sociology of sport, and cultural studies of sport. Each of these fields has contributed valuable insights into the ways sport intersects with broader social structures and cultural dynamics. Yet, within this expanding body of research, the field of sports criminology remains comparatively underdeveloped. Unlike sports sociology or sports law, which have achieved relatively autonomous academic status, sports criminology has often been overshadowed by these more established disciplines. As a result, core criminological concerns—crime prevention, criminal justice processes, and mechanisms of social control—have not been systematically examined in the context of sport.
This research identifies a critical gap, particularly concerning organizational or organized crime in sport. Although organized crime has long been central to criminological analysis and criminal law, its manifestations within sport have not received adequate scholarly attention. The concept of organized crime—with its focus on structured group activity, continuity, hierarchy, and illicit profit—offers significant analytical utility. Nevertheless, despite the recognized importance of organizational features from both legal and criminological perspectives, international scholarship has shown limited interest in defining or analyzing how these characteristics appear in sport. International bodies, for their part, have yet to articulate a comprehensive framework for identifying the distinctive attributes of organized corruption within the sporting domain.
Against this backdrop, the present study was designed with a dual purpose: first, to identify the essential characteristics of organized corruption in sport; and second, to interpret these characteristics through established criminological theories. The research adopts a descriptive–analytical method, relying on library-based sources including academic books, journal articles, reports from international organizations, and relevant legal instruments. By synthesizing insights from these materials, the study aims to develop a robust analytical framework for understanding organized corruption in sport and to highlight potential directions for effective prevention and control.
The findings show that organized corruption in sport possesses both substantive and procedural features that distinguish it from other forms of crime. Notable attributes include the pursuit of profit—often realized through manipulation of betting markets and the financial exploitation of sport’s global popularity; the involvement of legal entities and corporations as active participants or facilitators of illicit schemes; the structural role of betting and gambling systems as enablers of corrupt behavior; and the persistence of non-criminal forms of corruption that, although not prosecutable, nonetheless erode sporting integrity and pave the way for criminal conduct. These features underscore the complexity of the phenomenon, which straddles the boundary between legality and illegality, public perception and legal sanction, individual culpability and organizational responsibility.
From a theoretical standpoint, the study demonstrates that organized corruption in sport can be fruitfully analyzed through a range of criminological perspectives. Strain theory illuminates how structural pressures within professional sport—particularly the intense emphasis on success and financial gain—create conditions conducive to deviance. The theory of planned behavior explains how attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived control shape decisions to engage in corrupt practices. Rational choice theory highlights the calculated assessment of risks and benefits that makes organized corruption appear profitable despite potential sanctions. The neoliberal paradigm draws attention to the ways market-oriented ideologies, commercialization, and deregulation generate fertile conditions for exploitation and criminal infiltration. Finally, frameworks grounded in social harm theory expand the conceptualization of corruption to include harmful practices that undermine trust, fairness, and the cultural value of sport.
The analysis ultimately demonstrates that organized corruption in sport is neither isolated nor marginal; rather, it is a systemic challenge deeply intertwined with broader social, economic, and political processes. Its transnational character—with activities spanning jurisdictions, involving multinational corporations, and exploiting global financial and digital systems—complicates regulatory responses. This reality highlights the inadequacy of traditional, domestically oriented approaches to crime control and underscores the need for innovative, cooperative, and interdisciplinary strategies.
In terms of policy implications, the study argues for several strategic measures. First, the development of educational programs tailored to athletes, coaches, administrators, and supporters is crucial for raising awareness of the risks and consequences of organized corruption. Second, a comprehensive international convention specifically targeting organized corruption in sport is needed to provide a unified legal framework and facilitate cross-border cooperation. Third, the definition of corruption itself requires reconceptualization—expanding beyond narrow criminal classifications to encompass the broader spectrum of harmful practices that undermine sporting integrity. Such a broadened definition would enable policymakers and scholars to capture more accurately the full range of activities that threaten fairness, transparency, and trust in sport.
In conclusion, this study underscores the urgency of integrating criminological perspectives into the study of sport and addressing organized corruption as a distinct and pressing issue. By situating the problem within criminological theory, identifying its unique characteristics, and proposing practical solutions, the research contributes to bridging a longstanding gap in both scholarship and policy. Given sport’s global cultural influence and vast resources, it demands analytical frameworks capable of safeguarding its integrity. The findings suggest that combating organized corruption in sport requires not only legal instruments but also interdisciplinary engagement, theoretical innovation, and sustained international collaboration.
Criminal law and criminology
zeynab Riazat; Zahra Ahmadi Natour
Abstract
Economic stability is a cornerstone of the legal and social order in any society, and its absence can lead to multifaceted problems for governments. Consequently, criminal policymakers worldwide, including in Iran, have consistently endeavored to combat economic crime as a complex phenomenon that disrupts ...
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Economic stability is a cornerstone of the legal and social order in any society, and its absence can lead to multifaceted problems for governments. Consequently, criminal policymakers worldwide, including in Iran, have consistently endeavored to combat economic crime as a complex phenomenon that disrupts a nation's economic structures. However, Iran's criminal policy faces significant ambiguity, challenges, and inefficiencies across various dimensions, including the definition, scope, and legal examples of economic crimes; establishing the conditions for the realization of the crime; the possibility of issuing interim orders; jurisdictional issues; and statutes of limitations. This research, conducted with a descriptive-analytical approach and library-based methodology, aims to identify and analyze these challenges within Iran's legislative and judicial criminal policy framework.
The study's findings indicate that the core of the inefficiency lies in the fundamental ambiguity at the legislative stage, particularly the lack of a clear, comprehensive, and consensus-based definition of "economic crime." This primary ambiguity creates a domino effect, cascading into and crippling the subsequent judicial process.
Conceptual and Exemplary Ambiguity in Legislative Criminal Policy: The Epicenter of the Crisis
The most significant challenge in Iran's legislative criminal policy is the absence of a precise, criteria-based legal definition for economic crime. The Iranian legislature has employed scattered and often contradictory laws, such as the Islamic Penal Code (2013), the Law on Combating Smuggling of Goods and Currency, and the Law on Punishment of Disruptors of the Economic System, without providing a unified conceptual framework. Key terms like "disruption of the country's economic system," "financial crime," and "economic corruption" are used interchangeably and vaguely.
This ambiguity is starkly evident in the Islamic Penal Code (2013). For instance:• The Note of Article 36 lists specific crimes (e.g., embezzlement, bribery, smuggling, disruption of the economic system) requiring mandatory publication of verdicts, without explicitly labeling them "economic crimes."• Article 47 prohibits the suspension of sentencing for "economic crimes where the subject of the crime exceeds 10 billion."• Article 109(b) excludes from statutes of limitations "economic crimes, including fraud and the crimes subject to the Note of Article 36 of this law, observing the amount stipulated in that article."
This legislative approach has spawned a central ambiguity: Are the crimes listed in the Note of Article 36 inherently "economic," with the monetary thresholds in Articles 47 and 109 merely triggering specific punishments? Or is reaching a specific financial threshold (e.g., 100 billion for Article 109) the primary criterion for an offense to be considered an "economic crime"? This lack of clarity has led to divergent opinions among legal scholars and practitioners.
Furthermore, the list of examples in the law is neither comprehensive nor precise. Crucial and emerging economic offenses, such as capital market crimes, specific banking offenses, cyber-economic crimes, consumer rights violations, and large-scale environmental crimes, are omitted. This omission means that many destructive behaviors escape the stringent criminal policies reserved for economic crimes, such as the non-applicability of statutes of limitations.
Even within the listed examples, significant interpretive ambiguities persist regarding their scope, including their application to attempted crimes and complicity, the inclusion of various types of fraud, the scope of embezzlement, the ambiguities surrounding the crime of influence peddling, and the applicability of these laws to crimes committed by the armed forces.
Recent reform bills, such as the Bill on Combating Economic Crimes, have attempted to address these issues by removing vague phrases such as “and the like” and providing a more exhaustive list of examples. However, these efforts have failed to address the core problem, as they continue to rely on an exemplary approach rather than establishing a clear, overarching criterion.
2. The Cascading Judicial Consequences of Legislative Ambiguity
The ambiguities in legislation directly translate into serious operational challenges within the judicial system, leading to a fragmented and inconsistent criminal policy in practice.
2.1. Divergence of Judicial Opinions
The most prominent judicial challenge is the lack of consensus in judicial precedent regarding the conditions and elements of economic crimes, particularly the "intent of the perpetrator" and the interpretation of "disruption of the economic system." This is vividly illustrated in high-profile cases. For example, in the "Sultan of Coin" case, the court deemed proving the widespread disruptive result sufficient for a conviction of "corruption on earth," whereas in other similar cases, judges have required the "intent to counter the system" as a necessary condition. This inconsistency, stemming from the absence of a clear criterion to distinguish an "ordinary economic crime" from a "system-disrupting economic crime," leads to disparate sentencing and violates the principle of equality before the law.
2.2. Determination of Competent Authority
A major procedural challenge is confusion over jurisdictional competence between general criminal courts and the Revolutionary Courts. Disputes often arise regarding which court should hear cases of "disruption in the economic system," leading to protracted legal battles, preliminary rulings on lack of jurisdiction, and significant delays in proceedings, ultimately undermining the efficiency of justice.
2.3. Statutes of Limitations
The legislative ambiguity surrounding the definition and examples of economic crimes creates a two-fold problem regarding statutes of limitations under Article 109. First, there is uncertainty about whether the list is exhaustive. Second, the law fails to specify the critical time for assessing the financial threshold (e.g., one billion)—whether it is the time of the crime's commission or the time of its discovery. This is particularly problematic for crimes like fraud that may remain undetected for years. Judicial practice generally favors the time of commission, but the lack of explicit legal provision causes disputes.
2.4. Interim Criminal Orders
A significant procedural gap is the absence of an explicit legal mechanism for interim criminal orders in the Code of Criminal Procedure (2012). In economic crimes, where swift action is often needed to freeze assets, suspend suspicious bank payments, or prevent the dissipation of public funds, judges lack clear legal authority to issue such urgent orders. This forces them to resort to broad interpretations of existing, often inadequate, laws, resulting in judicial practice based on personal discretion rather than a standardized procedure. This legal vacuum allows perpetrators valuable time to hide or transfer assets, severely hampering effective enforcement.
2.5. Reliance on the Principle of Independence (in Banking Instruments)
A complex challenge arises at the intersection of economic crime and commercial law, specifically concerning banking instruments like letters of credit and bank guarantees. The principle of independence, which dictates that the bank's payment obligation is separate from the underlying contract, often clashes with the discovery of fraud. While this principle is crucial for commercial certainty, its rigid application—without explicit statutory recognition of "fraud" as an exception—can be exploited by economic criminals. Iranian judicial practice shows significant divergence in handling cases where fraudulent documents are presented, with some courts upholding the principle of independence and ordering payment, while others acknowledge the fraud and initiate criminal proceedings. This lack of a unified approach creates a dangerous legal loophole.
Conclusion and Recommendations
This study conclusively demonstrates that the inefficiency of Iran's criminal policy against economic crimes is not incidental but rooted in a fundamental cause: the lack of a transparent conceptual framework and a criteria-based definition at the legislative stage. The current approach, characterized by scattered, incomplete, and ambiguous exemplary lists, is itself a source of perpetual ambiguity that cascades into the judicial system, causing divergence in opinions, jurisdictional conflicts, and procedural inefficiencies.
The proposed solution is not piecemeal amendments but a paradigm shift toward a criteria-based criminal policy. The core recommendations are:
Formulate a Criteria-Based Definition: The legislature, in collaboration with experts, must prioritize establishing a comprehensive and reliable definition of economic crime based on the "protected value" (macro-economic order) and "diagnostic criteria" (e.g., scale of damage, extensiveness of effects, and context of commission).
Shift from an Exemplary to a Criteria-Based Approach: Instead of relying on exhaustive and perpetually incomplete lists, the law should provide a general framework based on a result-oriented criterion (e.g., "any act or omission that causes widespread disruption to the country's economic order"). Well-established examples can be provided illustratively, not exhaustively. This balances the principle of legality with the flexibility needed to combat new forms of crime.
Clarify Legal Ambiguities: The law must explicitly clarify the time for assessing the financial threshold, the scope of specific punishments, and formally recognize "clear fraud" as an exception to the principle of independence in commercial documents.
Reform Procedural Laws: The Code of Criminal Procedure must be amended to explicitly incorporate a mechanism for interim criminal orders, granting courts clear authority to take urgent preventive measures in economic crime cases.
Ultimately, the enactment of a comprehensive and coherent "Law on Combating Economic Crimes," grounded in precise conceptual foundations, is essential to overcoming the current fragmentation and establishing unity of procedure in judicial authorities. Only through such foundational reforms can Iran's criminal policy hope to effectively deter the scourge of economic crime and safeguard public assets.
Criminal law and criminology
aref jafarian; Farid Mohseni; mohammadhadi tavakolpur
Abstract
The Electronic Monitoring Authority, established under Article 62 of the Islamic Penal Code of 2013 (1392) and formalized through the 2018 (1397) Executive Regulations, has now commenced large-scale operations across Iran. Designed to supervise offenders outside traditional incarceration, the initiative ...
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The Electronic Monitoring Authority, established under Article 62 of the Islamic Penal Code of 2013 (1392) and formalized through the 2018 (1397) Executive Regulations, has now commenced large-scale operations across Iran. Designed to supervise offenders outside traditional incarceration, the initiative aims to deliver both social and legal benefits. Central to assessing its success are two key issues: the quality of its implementation and the perceptions of the offenders subjected to electronic monitoring. To address these concerns, a structured questionnaire was administered to 100 individuals under electronic monitoring in Alborz and South Khorasan provinces, complemented by insights from legal experts to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the system’s effectiveness.
Methodology
The study adopted a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative and qualitative analyses. Individual interviews captured personal experiences, family-related impacts, device performance, and the practical effects of mobility restrictions. The collected data were analyzed to identify both strengths and limitations of the electronic monitoring system.
Results
1) Financial Aspects: The system successfully enables participation by financially disadvantaged offenders, which is viewed as a significant advantage. However, supervisory restrictions on mobility prevent 88% of participants from engaging in employment while under monitoring—representing a major limitation.
2) Technical Aspects: Device reliability remains a critical challenge. More than half of respondents (52%) reported at least one technical malfunction, and 36% required device repair or replacement. These technical vulnerabilities significantly reduce system effectiveness.
3) Offender and Family Experience: Most offenders evaluated electronic monitoring positively: 75% rated it as good or very good, and 69% reported that their families shared this positive assessment. Additionally, 65% faced no major difficulties in securing temporary permissions to leave the monitoring area, offering a clear advantage over incarceration. Psychological well-being remained generally stable, with 95% of male participants reporting no need for professional intervention (noting that men traditionally underreport such needs). Furthermore, 61% did not view the system as a hindrance to daily routines—an outcome likely to improve further with expanded mobility permissions. Conversely, 46% of family members experienced some limitations, an inherent feature of the system but one that could be mitigated by strategic adjustments in mobility policy.
4) Rehabilitation Impact: Home confinement affected 65% of participants, suggesting reduced opportunities for rehabilitation. Expanding mobility ranges and issuing targeted supervisory instructions may significantly improve rehabilitative outcomes.
5) Preference for Electronic Monitoring Over Other Mitigation Measures: Electronic monitoring was preferred by 58% of participants over suspended sentences or parole, particularly among individuals with minimal criminal histories. Moreover, 93% ranked electronic monitoring above semi-liberty arrangements. If implemented with expanded mobility allowances under appropriate regulatory guidelines, electronic monitoring could offer stronger supervisory capacity while maintaining high levels of offender preference.
6) Supervision Practices: Monthly telephonic contact with supervising authorities was viewed as non-intrusive by 70% of participants. While this benefits offenders by reducing perceived supervisory pressure, the study recommends supplementary identification and monitoring mechanisms to enhance public safety and ensure continuous compliance.
Conclusion
Despite notable technical and procedural challenges, electronic monitoring has been positively evaluated by the majority of participants and shows promising potential within Iran’s judicial framework. Policy refinements—particularly differentiated mobility allowances for offenders with specialized capacities or outdoor skills—could further enhance both rehabilitative outcomes and administrative efficiency. These findings affirm electronic monitoring as a viable complementary alternative to traditional incarceration, supporting offender reintegration while safeguarding public security
Law and Philosophy
shervin Moghimi; sepideh Mirmajidi
Abstract
Femicide in Iran—understood as the intentional killing of women on account of their gender, often manifesting as honor killings or domestic-violence-related murders—constitutes one of the most severe forms of gender-based violence and a profound violation of human rights. Despite the growing ...
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Femicide in Iran—understood as the intentional killing of women on account of their gender, often manifesting as honor killings or domestic-violence-related murders—constitutes one of the most severe forms of gender-based violence and a profound violation of human rights. Despite the growing visibility of such cases and increasing public concern, dominant legal approaches have remained inadequate for explaining the persistence and systemic character of this phenomenon. This article argues that a meaningful understanding of femicide in Iran requires an analytic framework that moves beyond conventional legal reasoning and engages with the deeper philosophical and structural conditions that shape the country’s legal-political order. Legal analyses confined to existing criminal codes and judicial procedures tend to focus on questions of culpability, enforcement gaps, or procedural shortcomings, while often overlooking the historical, ideological, and political foundations that condition both the limits of legal reform and the structural reproduction of gender-based violence.
Drawing on political philosophy, the article situates the problem of femicide within the broader tension between modernity and the legal-political configuration that emerged after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Although the Revolution was articulated through religious language, it was, in important respects, a modernist event that generated far-reaching expectations of social transformation, justice, and equality—including expectations relating to women’s status and rights. Yet the post-revolutionary legal system, grounded in traditional jurisprudential principles and patriarchal interpretations of Islamic law, failed to reconcile these aspirations with its own structural foundations. This misalignment produced a widening gap between the evolving social realities of Iranian society and a legal order anchored in premodern, gender-hierarchical norms. The consequences of this gap are especially visible in the domain of women’s rights and personal security, where the system’s inability to adapt has contributed to an environment in which violence against women is both facilitated and insufficiently addressed.
The article contends that femicide in Iran cannot be reduced to individual criminal acts but must be understood as an expression of deeper contradictions between the ideological premises of the political regime and the socio-legal expectations of a modern society. The persistence of gender-based violence is rooted in a legal order that simultaneously claims modern legitimacy while remaining tethered to premodern structures of authority and value. This tension is particularly evident in the treatment of crimes involving so-called “honor,” in the differential valuation of women’s lives embedded in certain legal provisions, and in the reluctance of the legal-political establishment to adopt comprehensive protective measures for women. As a result, legal discourse that treats femicide as a problem solvable through adjustments to existing laws is inherently limited, as it neglects the structural contradictions that undermine the effectiveness of such reforms.
To illustrate these limitations, the article reviews dominant legal arguments concerning femicide in Iran and identifies their epistemic shortcomings, including an overreliance on textualist interpretations of statutory law, insufficient engagement with sociopolitical contexts, and the assumption that legal reform can succeed without confronting the ideological tensions embedded in the legal system itself. While legal proposals often focus on modifying penalties, redefining categories of homicide, or strengthening enforcement mechanisms, they rarely address the structural barriers that impede implementation or social internalization.
The article then turns to an examination of the Islamic Revolution as a modernist founding moment, highlighting the elements of modern political philosophy—such as popular sovereignty, revolutionary agency, and aspirations to equality—that informed its early discourse. Although these elements were never coherently integrated into the post-revolutionary order, they introduced new expectations that have shaped Iranian society, particularly in recent decades. Within this context, the legal system has intermittently attempted to adapt to the modernist implications of the Revolution’s founding moment, most notably through proposals aimed at strengthening protections for women.
A significant example of this partial and contested adaptation is the “Bill for the Protection of Women Against Violence,” one of the most ambitious legislative attempts to address structural violence against women in Iran. The bill’s prolonged movement through governmental and judicial institutions—and the substantial revisions it underwent—reveals the depth of the structural tensions between modernist demands for gender justice and the traditionalist underpinnings of the legal system. The debates surrounding the bill underscore the persistent conflict between patriarchal jurisprudential interpretations and emerging expectations shaped by social change, global norms, and internal pressures for reform. The bill thus provides a valuable lens for examining the contradictions that obstruct the formation of a coherent legal response to femicide.
Ultimately, the article argues that understanding the persistence of femicide—and the inadequacy of legal reasoning confined to existing frameworks—requires a deeper engagement with the philosophical and structural foundations of the legal system. Addressing femicide demands more than adjusting legal definitions or enhancing penalties; it requires a rethinking of the ideological premises upon which the system is built, particularly with respect to gender, authority, and the relationship between law and social reality. Without confronting these foundational tensions, legal reforms will continue to treat symptoms rather than causes, leaving the structural conditions that enable gender-based violence intact.
The article concludes that any meaningful pursuit of gender justice in Iran must begin with a critical reassessment of the legal-political foundations established after the Revolution. Only by acknowledging and addressing the contradictions between modern social expectations and premodern legal structures can the legal system hope to develop an effective response to femicide. In this sense, the analysis offered here aims not only to critique existing legal approaches but also to contribute to a broader intellectual and political effort to reconceptualize the foundations of justice, equality, and legal authority in contemporary Iran.
Code of Criminal Procedure
Abbas Mansourabadi; Mahdi Sheideian; Ferdows Aghagolzadeh; Zahra Rajaei
Abstract
Whether a country’s procedural system is inquisitorial or accusatorial is not something explicitly stipulated in its laws. It can only be determined by examining the country’s cultural background, the views of legal scholars, the synthesis of legal provisions, and similar factors. In the ...
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Whether a country’s procedural system is inquisitorial or accusatorial is not something explicitly stipulated in its laws. It can only be determined by examining the country’s cultural background, the views of legal scholars, the synthesis of legal provisions, and similar factors. In the domestic literature, it has almost become a cliché that Iran’s criminal procedure system is of a “mixed” type: during the preliminary investigation stage, it bears the characteristics of an inquisitorial system, while during the trial stage, it supposedly adopts features of the accusatorial system. Discussions of the development of this mixed system have so far centered mainly on the pre-trial stages and their gradual movement toward a more accusatorial structure. In contrast, authors have addressed the trial stage far less frequently. This neglect may be precisely why the cliché has seldom been subjected to serious reflection or criticism and is instead accepted as a settled and unproblematic matter.
However, when the existing theoretical literature on inquisitorial and accusatorial adjudication (as typically associated with the Civil Law and Common Law families, respectively) is examined more closely—alongside the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the actual practice of criminal adjudication in Iranian courts—the prevailing belief becomes open to doubt. This article therefore seeks to answer the question: What are the challenges to realizing an accusatorial trial stage in Iranian law?
To address this question, the article employs a descriptive-analytical method and library research. It first discusses the theoretical basis for the idea that a “mixed” criminal procedure system is possible—a model that ostensibly creates balance by drawing on elements of both inquisitorial and accusatorial systems. It then examines, as far as possible, the claim that Iran’s criminal trial stage incorporates accusatorial elements, both in legal doctrine and in the Code of Criminal Procedure adopted in 2013. A conclusion is then drawn from the synthesis of these two parts.
The findings indicate that in so-called mixed systems, the materials collected during the pre-trial stages and the indictment exert substantial influence over the court proceedings. As a result, inquisitorial elements—especially the judge’s investigative role—tend to dominate over adversarial contestation between the parties. The trial becomes largely formal and confirmatory. In practice, the claim that the trial stage is conducted according to accusatorial principles does not materialize.
With regard to Iran specifically, the hypothesis of this research—that criminal adjudication exhibits more inquisitorial than accusatorial characteristics—is confirmed. Although lawyers do have a role, the central role belongs to the case file and to the judge. The adversarial “battle” between the parties does not occur; instead, the struggle appears to unfold between the judge and the accused, with the judge effectively continuing the role of the prosecutor and becoming a party to the case.
An examination of key articles of the 2013 Code of Criminal Procedure that purport to regulate adversarial trials reveals a lack of alignment with the Common Law concept of adversariality. Moreover, the Code’s continued emphasis on truth-finding during the trial stage, together with the recognition of the judge’s personal knowledge as the highest form of probative evidence—a doctrine that can undermine the principles of orality and immediacy—further demonstrates the gap between terminology and substance. From this perspective, many of the 2013 reforms appear superficial, limited primarily to adopting certain vocabulary. At best, they reflect a legislative awareness of, or aspiration toward, European procedural models and an attempt to create a more democratic facade under pressures from the global community.
Overall, the findings of this research suggest that reliance on the label of a “mixed system” can be misleading, detached from procedural reality, and ultimately aligned with existing structures of power.
