Journal of Criminal Law Research

Abstract Abstract
Every society reacts in certain ways to criminal acts such as murder. In this
essay, the reaction of Afghani legal system to the crime of murder and
elements of murder will be examined. Firstly, through the introduction,
different types of punishment prescribed in Afghani Criminal Act will be
addressed, as well as the issue of implementation or non-implementation of
Qisas (religious punishment providing that murder’s blood must be shed)
which has given rise to ambiguity in punishment of murder. Under the
heading of Mens Rea in the first book of the Afghan Criminal Act, the
concepts of criminal intention and contingent intent have been recognized.
Thus, crime of murder, accordingly, can be categorized into murder in the
absolute sense and presumed as a murder. In the first part, the punishment
for the murder in the absolute sense and the impacts of exacerbating
circumstances on that will be considered. The second part will be dedicated
to the analysis of the presumed murder. Finally, the consequential and
complimentary punishments and civil liability arising out of the murder will
be briefly dealt with in the third part.

Abstract Abstract
From the primary (scientific) victimology point of view some people -due to
the special charm- are attractive for delinquents who are considered as
potential victims in the criminology. Hence, the victim can be appropriate
element in pre􀀼 criminal situations. Seductive and provocative behaviors and
women’s carelessness may provide a proper context to make them victim of
sexual assault. Furthermore, as the target of the crime, they have a decisive
role; in addition, their physical characteristics, social status and their
relationship with delinquents have considerable role in their victimization.
Therefore, it can be argued that women occasionally are not merely passive
targets of crime, but also sometimes they are cause of their victimization.
This article sought to examine whether women can be blamed in sexual
crimes?

Abstract This paper tries to examine the foundations of right to bear arms in USA
legal system. This right is the most ancient right which has been a subject for
philosophical arguments of Aristotle and Plato. Some believe that the right
to bear arms is a fundamental and constitutional right of the citizens, but the
opponents argue that it is inimical to an oligarchic regime. According to the
first view, the criminal law supports the holders to bear arm and punishes
everyone who violates this right. However, according the second, bearing
arms by violation of the law has been criminalized and offenders should be
convicted. Among these approaches, the common law system was affected by
the proponent of right to bear arms, therefore, this right has been recognized
for the people. Under this circumstance, the founders of United States
Constitution allocated the second amendment to this right. Yet, the
Constitution of Iran did not have any article about right to bear arm so that
the legislator could be able how to regulate this part. The first chapter of
this paper examines the primary philosophical arguments on right to bear
arms and the second chapter is about the rules of common law regarding
this right. Finally, the third chapter examines the effect of philosophical
approaches and common law rules on the evolution of right to bear arms in
the United State legal system and the different criminal policy of Iran.

Abstract There are some religious narrations prohibiting one to intercede for
offenders in Hodud (specific religious punishments). These narrations have
often been construed and interpreted categorically and specifically referred
to Hodud in its idiomatic and narrow sense, i.e. specific religious
punishments. This understanding, in its turn, has led to form a differential
system of Had-Ta’zir. Through a critical study of the related narrations, the
author concludes that the intercession in Had and Ta’zir is not as much
different as it is understood in the traditional view. First, the prohibition of
intercession for criminals is not limited to those who have been convicted to
Hodud. Discriminatory and unwise intercession or the one which weakens
the certainty of punishment, are not acceptable- whether in Had or Ta’zir
punishment. Secondly, the prohibition of intercession for the offenders in
Hodud cases is not categorical. According to some evidences in the related
narrations, it is allowed to intercede for wrongdoer provided that the case
has not been taken to the court yet; particularly when the case revolves
around the right of people (rather than right of God) and the wrongdoer has
repented and been corrected or the crime has been proved through the
offender’s confession

Abstract According to the conventional definition, fair trial is a trial by a
competent tribunal in accordance with procedural guarantees to protect the
defendants’ constitutional and legal rights especially in order to respect
his/her human dignity and presumption of innocence. Based on the argument
providing that justice and equity require recognizing the victim’s and
defendant’s rights in criminal proceeding, the present article seeks to
reconsider the notion “fair trial” from a descriptive definition to a
prescriptive one. In the former, respecting to human dignity of the defendant
based on his/her presumption of innocence are considered as two essential
basic elements and providing an impartial court or tribunal and procedural
guarantees for defendant’s rights are regarded as super structural elements
based upon. According to the latter, the article concludes introducing a
descriptive definition to recognize both parties within the principle of
balance between victim’s and defendant’s rights.

Abstract Article 37 (A) of Islamic Penal Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran (2013)
referes to "one or two degrees of decrease in incarceration ". The wording
of the article makes two interpretations of the word "decrease" possible;
according to the first interpretation, the word has a general meaning and
contains both "reduction and substitution". The interpretation is based on
three arguments, i.e. legislative intent, context (internal criminal co-text)
and the rule of interpretation in favor of the accused. While criticizing the
first interpretation, the present essay supports the second interpretation with
reference to the semantic meaning, legislative history, purpose of legislation,
and various contexts. According to the second interpretation, the word
"decrease" in this article only means "reduction of the punishment"; hence,
the substitution of another more proper punishment for incarceration will
not be possible according to article 37 (A).