Introduction

One of the fundamental debates in criminal law concerns clarifying the relationship between the conditions of criminal responsibility and the constituent elements of crime. Under Article 140 of the Islamic Penal Code of 2013, criminal responsibility in cases of fixed punishments (ḥudūd), retaliation (qiṣāṣ), and discretionary punishments (ta’zīrāt) arises only when the offender, at the time of committing the offense, was sane, had reached the age of legal responsibility, and acted of their own volition. The legislator has identified these three elements as the conditions of criminal responsibility. However, a close examination of the material and mental elements of a crime clearly shows that their realization itself depends on the existence of these same three conditions. In other words, the absence of any one of them undermines one of the essential pillars of the offense, such that, fundamentally, no crime is committed.

Previous research shows that there is no single view on the relationship between criminal responsibility and the conditions of crime. The literature reveals a fragmented picture and a lack of a unified analysis of how these conditions affect the realization of crime. It is thus necessary to address the issue through an integrated approach, with particular emphasis on the role of sanity, maturity, and volition in the realization of the elements of crime. In this respect, the present study aimed to clarify the logical relationship between the three conditions of criminal responsibility (i.e., sanity, maturity, and volition) and the constituent elements of crime. It sought to demonstrate that criminal responsibility arises solely from the components that constitute the essential elements of the offense, and that, once the three elements of the crime are established, no additional conditions need to be proven in order to impose criminal responsibility. The study also offered a critique of the prevailing view that treats these conditions as external to the elements of crime, arguing instead that sanity, maturity, and volition are not independent and subsequent conditions but prerequisites for the realization of the elements of the crime, particularly the mental element and the attributability of the material element.

Materials and Methods

This research adopted a descriptive–analytical approach based on library and documentary sources. It began with a detailed examination of legal provisions, particularly the Islamic Penal Code of 2013, to analyze the concept of criminal responsibility and its conditions. It then reviewed and critically assessed the opinions and theories of jurists in order to examine the relationship between these conditions and the elements of crime. In doing so, the analysis employed a granular approach, separating the components of the mental element (e.g.., knowledge of the facts, knowledge of the law, will, and criminal intent) to clarify the fundamental role of sanity, maturity, and volition in the realization of each element.

Results and Discussion

The analysis yielded several insights. First, sanity and maturity function as prerequisites for the formation of criminal intent and knowledge of the factual circumstances of the offense; without them, the mental element of the crime cannot be realized. A person who lacks sanity or has not reached maturity does not possess the necessary capacity for the formation of criminal intent. Second, volition is an essential condition for attributing the material element of the crime to the perpetrator. In situations where volition is absent (e.g., in cases of duress, coercion, necessity, or instantaneous insanity), the material element of the crime is either not attributable to the perpetrator at all or must instead be attributed to a more decisive factor, such as the coercing party.

The study further demonstrated that concepts such as duress, insanity, minority, and severe mental disorders should in fact be understood as factors that undermine the elements of the crime itself— contrary to the traditional view that treats them merely as factors negating responsibility. Moreover, in provisions such as Articles 151 and 153 of the Islamic Penal Code, the legislator—by using the phrase shall not be punished rather than stating that no crime has been committed—has incorrectly treated the absence of the conditions of responsibility merely as a ground for non-punishment, whereas in such cases the crime has, in principle, not occurred.

Conclusion

Although referred to in Article 140 of the Islamic Penal Code as conditions of criminal responsibility, sanity, maturity, and volition actually play a foundational and essential role in the realization of the elements of crime. In the absence of these three conditions, the mental and material elements of the offense are fundamentally deficient, and, in essence, no crime is established that would require an assessment of criminal responsibility. Therefore, the traditional view of these concepts as conditions external to the elements of crime gives rise to analytical fallacies in criminal law and, at times, to unjust judgments. Accordingly, it is proposed that, in revising Article 140, the legislator replace the term conditions of criminal responsibility with necessary conditions for the realization of the elements of crime, or at least explicitly clarify that these conditions must be taken into account in analyzing the material and mental elements of crime. It is also essential for judicial authorities to examine these three conditions before making a final determination as to the occurrence of a crime, rather than afterward. Such a conceptual and procedural reform could constitute an important step towards criminal justice and a more accurate interpretation of penal laws.

By identifying the theoretical gap between the conditions for the realization of crime and the conditions for criminal responsibility, this research proposed a novel analytical model that could serve as a foundation for legislative revision and judicial practice. A major contribution of this study is the development of a coherent framework for classifying crime-negating factors into two categories: (1) factors that undermine the mental element, such as insanity and minority; and (2) factors that undermine the attributability of the material element, such as duress and necessity. This framework not only resolves theoretical ambiguities but also facilitates the practical application of legal provisions by judges.