When norms and interactions arise within a society, they are understood as social phenomena or social reality. Across different countries, these phenomena may take deviant forms, which societies often define as criminal behavior. Punishment, in contrast, is a complex and multifaceted concept that seeks both to deter crime and to prepare individuals for rehabilitation. While extensive scholarship has examined the advantages and disadvantages of punishment from various perspectives, a more fundamental question remains: Do we fully understand the concept of punishment itself? Addressing this question is essential before engaging in deeper philosophical or theoretical debates. Given the sociological nature of punishment, this study proposes a distinctive and constructive definition influenced by eighteenth-century positivism. Although theoretical insights are valuable, adopting a scientific and objective approach to understanding punishment is of primary importance. By recognizing punishment as a social phenomenon, we can examine its relationship with broader social structures, particularly social solidarity. Generally, the penal system rests on two equally significant foundations: the authority of power and sovereignty, and social solidarity rooted in the collective conscience. Consequently, identifying the relationships between punishment and other social phenomena allows for a more accurate and comprehensive definition of punishment. Using a qualitative and interdisciplinary approach, this research examines the position of punishment among other social phenomena and analyzes its relationships with them, drawing on findings from sociology and criminal justice studies.
 
Introduction:
Crime and punishment are two fundamental social phenomena from which no society has ever been exempt, and they continue to attract increasing attention from legal scholars and sociologists. Although these phenomena are closely interconnected and form a causal relationship, they differ significantly in nature. Crime, despite being an inevitable and enduring element of human societies, is consistently regarded as a deviant and negative phenomenon. Punishment, by contrast, has been shaped by diverse philosophical foundations—including moralism, justice-oriented theories, utilitarianism, and social utility—and is generally perceived as necessary and positive. This characterization, however, does not imply support for the expansion or prescription of punishment.
The present study focuses specifically on the nature of punishment. Temporally and conceptually, it precedes inquiries into the logic of penalization and the mechanisms of criminalization. Consequently, discussions concerning the philosophy of punishment, its quantity and quality, and its legitimacy belong to subsequent stages of analysis and fall outside the scope of this research. Moreover, the issues addressed here are examined independently of the perspectives of penal reformers and the established schools of criminal law, such as the Classical, Positivist, and other traditions. This is due, first, to the study’s primary objective of deepening and analyzing the concept of punishment from a sociological standpoint, and second, to its departure from approaches that typically conceptualize punishment in purely philosophical or abstract terms—as deterrence, as the complete realization of justice, or as a corrective and rehabilitative instrument. Instead, this study adopts a distinct approach by offering a combined definition that initially addresses the objective dimensions of punishment and subsequently its abstract aspects.
Examining punishment through the lens of criminal sociology—independent of predetermined goals, officially declared policies, and dominant penal theories—allows for an analysis of its nature, functions, transformations, and the role of social forces in shaping penal practices (Javan Jafari, 2012: 1085). Accordingly, this study engages with the works of prominent Western sociologists who have extensively explored punishment and its relational context. Among these contributions, Émile Durkheim’s analysis holds a particularly authoritative position; therefore, a critical examination of his work is essential for developing a realistic understanding of punishment as a social phenomenon.
One of the most significant features of Durkheim’s approach, which distinguishes him from other social reformers, is his examination of punishment largely independent of its functions, goals, and intentions. For Durkheim, punishment should not be defined, as policymakers often do, as a deterrent mechanism for reducing crime, nor, as penal scholars typically do, as the official response of a competent authority to criminal behavior through formal penal techniques administered by the criminal justice system (Gholami, 2020: 20–22). Rather, he regarded punishment as possessing an inherent reality and authenticity within society. From this perspective, punishment is a meaningful institution through which social values are expressed and collective moral energies are released. More precisely, punishment does not serve a predetermined purpose, nor is it merely a means to achieve objectives such as crime reduction, prevention, or deterrence. Instead, it emerges as a social fact that exists by virtue of the nature of social life itself (Cladis, 2023: 45).
Accordingly, rather than interpreting punishment through preconstructed theoretical frameworks and then explaining it in those terms, this study emphasizes a direct engagement with the essence of punishment in order to understand it on its own terms. This approach minimizes interpretive intermediaries and seeks, as far as possible, to reach the core meaning of punishment as a social phenomenon.